CLASS, GENDER, AND ARREST: AN INTERGENERATIONAL ANALYSIS OF WORKPLACE POWER AND CONTROL*

CHRISTOPHER UGGEN
University of Minnesota

Power-control theory posits that parental workplace positions affect adolescent law violation. To date, however, no test of the theory has directly measured occupational power and control. This paper tests whether parental and adolescent workplace freedom and control affect criminal behavior and arrest as the theory predicts, using data from a prospective longitudinal survey of 1,000 adolescents and their parents. The results suggest sex differentials in the effects of maternal authority position and parental freedom and control. In particular, daughters whose mothers hold authority positions are more likely to be arrested than are daughters whose mothers do not hold such positions. The effects of adolescent employment also differ by sex, with perceived workplace power and control reducing rates of arrest among females but increasing them among males.

This paper tests an intergenerational model of class, gender, and arrest derived from Hagan’s power-control theory (Hagan et al., 1985, 1987, 1990). Power-control theory posits a statistical interaction between the effects of parental social class and child’s gender on law violation. Though it has stimulated several lines of research on class and gender, many important specifications of the theory remain untested (Chesney-Lind and Shelden, 1998; Hagan et al., 1990; Jensen and Thompson, 1990). In particular, tests of power-control theory have yet to operationalize parental power and control directly or to consider how adolescents’ workplace positions may affect law violation.

First, workplace freedom and control is the hypothesized mechanism linking parents’ class positions to the informal social controls they exercise in family relations (Colvin and Pauly, 1983; Hagan et al., 1985:1155–1156,

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1987:796; see also Kohn, 1977), which, in turn, affect their children’s delinquency. To date, however, these workplace controls have yet to be measured in criminological research. Second, many investigations have assessed class in terms of parents’ occupations, despite their “doubtful relevance” (Greenberg, 1977:216; Hagan and McCarthy, 1991) to adolescent law violation and the heterogeneity within occupations in workplace authority and control. The role of adolescent workplace controls in causing or inhibiting crime and delinquency has yet to be specified in theory or research. To the extent that youth status has been considered in the delinquency literature, the school has been its primary if not exclusive focus (Colvin and Pauly, 1983; Hirschi, 1969; Stark, 1979; Tittle and Meier, 1990:293), or extremely marginalized youth have been the focus of the investigation (Hagan and McCarthy, 1997). Yet, these specifications ignore the near-ubiquity of employment among adolescents (Manning, 1990; Schneider and Schmidt, 1996; Steinberg, 1996), the diversity of their work experiences (Bachman and Schulenberg, 1993), and the potential importance of youth employment as a transmission belt linking status origins and deviant outcomes. This investigation therefore specifies objective and subjective dimensions of parental and adolescent workplace control and gauges their effects on law violation.

POWER AND CONTROL AT HOME, WORK, AND SCHOOL

PARENTAL EMPLOYMENT AND POWER-CONTROL THEORY

The core assumption of power-control theory is that “the presence of power and the absence of control create conditions of freedom that permit common forms of delinquency” (Hagan et al., 1985:1174). These conditions are thought to emanate from parents’ relative freedom and control in the occupational structure. According to power-control theory, parents with greater workplace authority and autonomy eschew rigid disciplinary practices at home to foster entrepreneurial, risk-taking orientations in their children (Grasmick et al., 1996; Hagan, 1989:158). Freedom and control in the workplace are thereby reproduced in the family.

Parental control of children, however, is stratified by gender: Girls are more likely to be objects of control than are boys, and mothers are more likely to be instruments of control than are fathers. Hagan et al. (1979) trace the sex differentiation of social control to the structural separation of work and family that began with industrialization (see also Feeley and Little, 1991; Wellford, 1990). Traditional or “patriarchal” families, in which only the male is employed in a position of authority, perpetuate this division of labor by encouraging female restraint and male aggressiveness. Consequently, boys from the employer or managerial classes have the
greatest freedom to deviate, and girls from these classes are subject to the
greatest control. The relative absence of control over boys emboldens
them to take risks and flout social norms. By inculcating an enterprising
spirit in their boys, owner- and manager-class parents unwittingly foster
deviant risk taking as well. Hagan et al. (1985) thus hypothesized a sta-ti-cal interaction between gender and class origins, echoing Bonger’s early
prediction that “the criminality of men differs more from that of women in
the well-to-do classes than in classes less privileged” (Bonger, 1916:477).

In its initial formulation, power-control theory assessed social class by
the employment, authority, and ownership status of the “head of house-
hold” (Hagan et al., 1985). Subsequent extensions of the theory (Grasmick
et al., 1996; Hagan et al., 1987, 1990; McCarthy et al., 1999) have
addressed maternal as well as paternal workplace (and, hence, familial)
control. Conceptually, these extensions apply Dahrendorf’s general treat-
ment of authority relations (1959:165) to processes of dominance and sub-
jection within the household. Operationally, Hagan et al. cross-classify the
hierarchical authority position of the father and the mother to distinguish
“patriarchal” from “egalitarian” family structures. A greater gender dif-
erential is predicted in patriarchal families—those in which the father’s
workplace authority exceeds the mother’s—relative to families in which
both spouses hold equal authority positions.

The relative workplace positions of husbands and wives affect delin-
quency by structuring the “class dynamics of the family” (Hagan et al.,
1987:789) and child-rearing practices within the household. In the ideal-
typical patriarchal family, the husband is employed in a position of author-
ity, the wife is not employed, and family class relations are thereby unbal-
anced in favor of the husband. Under this arrangement, daughters are
subject to greater control than are sons and are socialized to avoid risk and
to perceive greater sanctions for deviance. In the ideal-typical egalitarian
family, both husband and wife are employed in equally powerful positions
of workplace authority. Under such arrangements, the instrument-object
control relationship between mothers and daughters is less pronounced
and both girls and boys are socialized to develop a taste for risk.

Power-control theory thus conceptualizes workplace freedom and con-

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control in terms of both Marxian ownership and Weberian or Dahrendorphan
authority. The most definitive tests of the theory to date have operational-
ized social class in objective relational terms, based on the ownership,
authority, and employment position of each parent. The multiplicity of
family arrangements in contemporary society, however, complicates
efforts to map these workplace relations onto real families. The primary
problem in this regard is the large residual number of families that are
neither “traditional-patriarchal” nor “egalitarian” (Hagan et al., 1985,
households, families in which the mother’s workplace authority exceeds the father’s, and those in which the father is unemployed has been particularly problematic (Leiber and Wacker, 1997; Morash and Chesney-Lind, 1991). Yet these “contradictory” family arrangements are increasingly prevalent and important to a theory of class, gender, and delinquency.

Investigations of gender and household power highlight the importance of the absolute and relative authority positions of women and men. Research has long shown that women who work outside the home have greater power than do those who do not work outside the home in two-parent families (Blood and Wolfe, 1960; Hochschild, 1989; Huber and Spitze, 1983, 1988). There have been comparatively fewer studies of how the specific work conditions of mothers and fathers affect family responsibilities and child-rearing practices (Menaghan and Parcel, 1990:1093), though maternal workplace authority may be more significant than are earnings in determining women’s power in the home (Brayfield, 1992). Maternal labor force participation and maternal workplace authority are, thus, likely determinants of family class relations.

Although the Hagan team’s initial tests of power-control theory have been partially replicated (Hill and Atkinson, 1988; Leiber and Wacker, 1997; Singer and Levine, 1988), the empirical evidence has been mixed. Some researchers question the appropriateness of assigning egalitarian/traditional or balanced/unbalanced designations (Leiber and Wacker, 1997; Morash and Chesney-Lind, 1991), whereas others find little support for the hypothesized relations among neo-Marxian class categories, familial control, and delinquency (Jensen and Thompson, 1990; see also Messner and Krohn, 1990). Perhaps the most improbable aspect of the theory is its apparent economic determinism: Could a parent’s workplace position really be the causal motor driving a distal phenomenon like a child’s criminality?

ADOLESCENT WORKPLACE POSITION

Youth employment is one mechanism that may help interpret the effect of parental workplace control on adolescent deviance. Though adolescent work has yet to be considered within power-control theory, youth workplace position may exert an independent effect on law violation in a manner consistent with the theory. To the extent that employment increases power and decreases control, it frees adolescents to commit crime and delinquency. Youth with greater workplace freedom and control may therefore be more likely to violate the law.

In adolescence, the school and family are the primary institutional agents of control (Hirschi, 1969; see also Jarjoura, 1996). To the extent that part-time adolescent employment has become a normative element of
the school-to-work transition, it too may function as a controlling influence. Alternatively, however, a precocious transition to adult work roles may increase independence and free adolescents to deviate, particularly if employment assumes primacy over age-graded educational and family responsibilities (Wright et al., 1997).

Several empirical generalizations regarding youth employment and deviance are well established in the research literature. The bivariate association between paid employment and law violation is positive for juveniles (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990:138; Hirschi, 1969; Mihalic and Elliott, 1997; Ploeger, 1997), though negative for young adults (Farrington et al., 1986; Sampson and Laub, 1990). Moreover, adolescent employment of long duration but low intensity appears to have beneficial effects in early adulthood (Mihalic and Elliott, 1997; Mortimer and Johnson, 2000), though long work hours are associated with delinquency and other problem behaviors (Agniew, 1986; Heimer, 1995; Steinberg and Dornbusch, 1991; Wright et al., 1997). Thus, the strength and direction of work effects on crime are contingent upon both life-cycle stage and employment characteristics.

Just as parental workplace positions affect the socialization of daughters and sons, adolescents' workplace positions may also have gender-specific effects. Theoretical treatments of the relation among adolescent work, school, and law violation have generally focused on boys (Cohen, 1955; Messerschmidt, 1994; Willis, 1977). Power-control theories, as well as interactionist accounts of gender and deviance (Bartusch and Matsueda, 1996; Heimer, 1995, 1996), predict sex differences in the meaning of work to adolescents and its effect on deviant behavior. Vertical mobility for men, much more than for women, has historically been tied to independent occupational achievement. Scholars have long observed that gender role socialization leads females to devote greater concern to managing relationships than do males, and males to devote greater attention to paid labor than do females (see e.g., Cohen 1955:60; England and Farkas, 1986; Gilligan, 1982; Heimer, 1995; Taylor et al., 1995). Today, both the levels of adolescent employment and its meaning for crime and delinquency may be changing for young men and women. From 1960 to 1996, for example, the female labor force participation rate for 16-to 19-year-olds grew from 30% to 52% (Bureau of the Census, 1997:403). Nevertheless, organizations and labor markets continue to reward males and females at different rates (Marini and Fan, 1997; Reskin and Roos, 1990). As long as differences in preferences and rewards persist, sex differences in the meaning of adolescent work and its implications for law violation are likely to be observed as well.

In addition to gender, social class origins and race may also condition the effects of adolescent employment (MacLeod, 1995; Sullivan, 1989).
Relative to lower class youth, adolescents from working-class or middle-class backgrounds are more likely to have socially embedded networks of contacts that facilitate entry into employment in their mid-teen years (Granovetter, 1985; Hagan, 1993). In neo-Marxian terms, those with origins in the surplus population should be less likely to work than should those from other class categories. In addition, these youth should be more susceptible to arrest—either because they may be subject to greater official scrutiny (Black, 1976, 1980), or because they may engage in more frequent or serious law violation (Elliott and Ageton, 1980; Farnworth et al., 1994; Wolfgang et al., 1987:105).

HYPOTHESES

Power-control theory posits that class- and gender-specific patterns of youth crime are driven by control structures within the home and workplace. To date, the theory has been tested by regressing self-reported delinquency on sex within each narrow class fraction or by sorting families into more and less patriarchal categories. The analysis to follow explicitly models the independent effects of maternal authority and family class position as well as the predicted gender interactions. The analytic strategy pursued in this paper also differs from previous tests of the theory by considering both objective power and control (based on neo-Marxian ownership and authority), and subjective power and control (based on the parents' self-reported degree of freedom and control at work). The first two hypotheses are drawn from Hagan et al.'s initial (1985) formulation of the theory.

H1: The family's overall level of workplace freedom and control will be positively associated with law violation and arrest among boys, net of race, family structure, and maternal authority position.

H2: The family's overall level of workplace freedom and control will be negatively associated with law violation and arrest among girls, net of race, family structure, and maternal authority position.

Power-control theory was subsequently elaborated to explicitly consider maternal workplace position (Hagan et al. 1987, 1990). According to the refined theory, mothers with workplace authority will socialize their daughters as they do their sons (1987:792); girls as well as boys from such families will be encouraged to take the entrepreneurial risks thought to increase both long-term economic prospects and common delinquent behavior. Regardless of the father's authority position and the family's overall level of workplace freedom and control, girls whose mothers hold positions of authority should be more likely to violate the law than should girls whose mothers lack workplace authority. Together, the 1985 and
1987 specifications suggest the simultaneous estimation of an overall family class effect and a maternal authority effect on law violation.

H3: Maternal workplace authority will increase law violation and arrest among girls, net of parental workplace freedom and control.

According to power-control theory, boys with greater workplace freedom and control will be most likely to violate the law once individual differences in family background and personal characteristics are statistically controlled. The theory does not specify the effect of adolescent workplace freedom and control for females. It may diminish controls and increase the freedom to deviate (as it does for males), its effects may depend on socialization processes tied to maternal authority, or it may be a peripheral or minor determinant of law violation. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis only addresses male law violation.

H4: Adolescent workplace freedom and control will have a positive effect on law violation and arrest among males, net of race, family structure, maternal authority, parental workplace freedom and control, school dropout status, and substance use.

DATA AND MEASURES

I analyze data from the Youth Development Study (YDS), a longitudinal investigation of the causes and consequences of adolescent employment. The YDS is a prospective study of 1,000 adolescents and their parents in St. Paul, Minnesota, a city of 272,000 in a metropolitan area of 2.5 million (Bureau of the Census, 1997:42, 47). During the first wave of data collection in 1989, youth completed questionnaires in their ninth-grade classrooms and responded by mail if absent when surveys were administered. A total of 925 mothers and 650 fathers completed an initial mail survey, representing 95% of the mothers and 90% of the fathers living with the youth study participants. In terms of race, family composition, income, and education, the sample is representative of the general population of ninth-grade students in St. Paul public schools (Finch et al., 1991). In 1995, four years after most participants had graduated from high school, respondents completed an extensive life-event calendar that included arrest outcomes. In 1998, a short checklist of retrospective self-reported delinquency items was added to the survey. More than three-fourths of the original respondents were retained through this 1998 survey.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The YDS data are ideal for testing several of the hypothesized relations in power-control theory. Because adolescent employment is the focus of the investigation, researchers collected a rich array of objective and subjective work history data for both parents and youth.
Family Class Position.

Family class position is first measured in terms of the household’s relation to the means of production when the youth is 14 to 15 years old. Employers are self-employed and employ others; the petite bourgeoisie are self-employed but do not employ others; managers and administrators supervise others but are not self-employed; workers are employed but do not supervise; and the surplus population is unemployed, not employed, or report a total annual family income below $10,000. Class position is measured at the household level of analysis. If either parent reports that they are self-employed and that they employ others, for example, the household is categorized as employer class. This neo-Marxian classification is consistent with the Hagan team’s initial formulation (1985) and other investigations of class and crime (Brownfield, 1986; Colvin and Pauly, 1983; Farnworth et al., 1994). Whereas class differences may be truncated within a public school sample, the descriptive statistics below show a diversity of class origins among YDS respondents and a class distribution similar to that observed in Hagan et al.’s Toronto study (1985:1159).

Parental Workplace Freedom and Control.

To indicate a household’s level of workplace freedom and control, I use parents’ reports of their freedom to decide their work activities and control over time spent at work. Both items were measured when the youth respondents were in the ninth grade and are scored on a five-point Likert scale. Parental freedom and control scores for families in which both parents are employed represent an average of the parents’ responses; scores for families in which only one parent is employed are based on that parent’s responses. Because freedom and control measures are closely correlated ($r = .70$), they are summed to compute a composite parental freedom and control index.

Maternal Authority and Work Intensity.

I measure maternal authority position directly, rather than classifying households as patriarchal, egalitarian, balanced, or unbalanced. This specification allows for the inclusion of single-parent households and “contradictory” family class relations (e.g., when maternal position exceeds paternal position), although the multivariate analysis focuses on two-parent households. Women employing or supervising others are coded as 1 on maternal authority and women not working outside the home or not employing or supervising others are coded as 0. Because women holding authority positions may also work longer hours, the relation between mother’s authority and daughter’s delinquency may be spurious due to this
common cause. I therefore control for maternal work intensity, measured in hours per week, in the multivariate models.

**Adolescent Employment.**

All adolescent employment measures are treated as time-varying covariates measured in waves one through four, during the panel’s high school years. Earnings and hours of employment indicate the quality and intensity of work. Adolescent workplace freedom and control items are identical to those used in the parent survey. As in the parent data, these variables are correlated at .70 and combined in a summative index.

**Adolescent Substance Use and School Misconduct.**

Because people self-select into work statuses, it is possible that the effects attributed to employment may be due to stable individual differences in criminal propensity or self-control. Gottfredson and Hirschi count smoking (1990:40, 90–92), early alcohol use (1990:90–94, 140), and school misconduct (1990:105–107, 159–163) among the manifestations of low self-control. Smoking is measured as a simple dichotomy, and drinking is measured on a seven-point scale. School misconduct is indicated by the number of times the respondent was sent to the principal’s office during the prior school year, and school dropout is dichotomous. As with adolescent employment, each of these time-dependent covariates is measured throughout the high school years during the first four waves of data collection.

**Dependent Variables**

Power-control theory was designed to explain “common delinquent behavior” (Hagan et al., 1985:1161), although its core propositions have been extended to more serious crimes (O’Brien, 1991; Simpson, 1991) and other forms of risk taking (Grasmick et al, 1996). The primary dependent variable in this analysis is the timing of first self-reported arrest, measured retrospectively in 1995 and 1998. The principal objection to the use of arrest data to test criminological theories is that arrest reflects police behavior rather than offender behavior. The empirical literature is divided on the role of extralegal factors in arrest, though police discretion may work against males (see Krohn et al., 1983; Uggen and Kruttschnitt, 1998; Visher, 1983), nonwhites (Dannefer and Schutt, 1982; Smith and Visher, 1981), and the poor (Wolfgang et al., 1987). For several reasons, however, arrest data are likely to be suitable for the present analysis.

First, and most importantly, arrest biases should result in more conservative tests of the hypotheses stated above. Because the theory predicts a positive relation between class origins and arrest for boys, for example,
police bias against boys from working-class or surplus population origins would attenuate this effect rather than inflate it. Moreover, the most important hypotheses to be tested involve interactions between two or more social positions, such as sex and maternal authority. Police bias or "chivalry" hypotheses do not predict discrimination against girls whose mothers supervise others relative to girls whose mothers do not supervise others. Second, to test the robustness of the arrest effects, the model will be partially replicated on retrospective self-report delinquency data. Third, I use covariate adjustment to statistically control for other potential sources of bias, such as race. Finally, research on police and victim behavior consistently shows crime severity to be the strongest predictor of whether a crime is reported and an arrest made (see Black, 1980; Gottfredson and Gottfredson, 1988).

If arrestees represent more frequent or serious law violators, however, does the arrest outcome fall outside power-control theory's "common delinquency" scope condition? Overall, 17% of YDS respondents reported they had been arrested. In addition to the year of first arrest, they were asked whether they had been arrested for crimes involving money (10% had), drugs and alcohol (8%), personal or violent offenses that did not involve money (3%), and other offenses (7%). Although there were too few arrests in each category to merit a separate analysis by sex and type of arrest, the outcome is tailored to more closely approximate arrest for common delinquency. I treat those arrested for personal or violent crimes but not for any other offenses as censored to obtain a measure of arrest for property, substance use, or other nonviolent offenses. The text and tables report results for this "common arrest" outcome below but also note the results for "any arrest" when the small number of violent-only arrestees are included.¹

Although the YDS lacks detailed offense information, aggregate data for Minnesotans aged 14 in 1988 are available to convey the nature of arrests for the YDS cohort (Minnesota Department of Public Safety, 1986–1998). From 1985 to 1998, the modal arrest categories for the Minnesota cohort were liquor law violations and driving while intoxicated, about 20% of their arrests were for Part I Index offenses, and the modal index category was larceny-theft (Uggen and Janikula, 1999). Thus, most YDS arrests were likely for the "common delinquent behavior" that power-control theory was designed to explain (Hagan et al., 1985:1161).

The date of arrest is established by responses to a 1995 life-event calendar (Freedman et al., 1988) and a 1998 question asking the age at first

¹. The results for "any arrest" parallel those presented below for "common arrest," though the effects of parental class are slightly stronger and the effects of youth workplace position slightly weaker for the former outcome.
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arrest. If the two measures conflicted, data from the more proximal 1995 survey were selected for analysis. Life-history calendars can yield high-quality retrospective data regarding the timing of events (Freedman et al., 1988; Horney and Marshall, 1991), especially when respondents are asked “Have you ever . . .” variety questions (Hindelang et al., 1981). Although errors in recall may be inevitable, reverse checks of police records suggest that self-reported arrest data are reasonably reliable and valid by social scientific standards (Hindelang et al., 1981; Schore et al., 1979). Because persons are more likely to underestimate the number of times they had been arrested than to err in reporting whether they had been arrested at all (Hagan and Palloni, 1988:94–95; Schore et al., 1979), the event history techniques employed below are unlikely to be systematically biased by underreporting.²

ESTIMATION AND RESULTS

For these data, event history analysis increases the precision of estimates by using all available information on the timing of the arrest outcome. In contrast, a logistic regression analysis would ignore the duration until arrest (treating 1989 arrests the same as 1995 arrests) and an ordinary least-squares regression of the time to arrest would needlessly discard information for censored cases (those who were never arrested). To identify sources of variation in the timing of arrest, I estimate Cox’s proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972). In this model, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the hazard rate of arrest. The data are interval censored because only the year of arrest (rather than the precise date) is known. I therefore treat “ties” in the duration to arrest by a method that assumes an underlying but unknown ordering for the tied event times (Allison, 1995:127). I estimate models of the form:

\[ \log h_i(t) = \alpha_0(t) + \beta_1 X_{i1} + \beta_2 X_{i2}(t) \ldots \beta_k X_{ik} \]

where \( \alpha_0(t) \) represents the natural logarithm of the unspecified baseline hazard function at time \( t \), \( X_1 \) represents fixed explanatory variables, \( \beta_1 \) represents the effects of these variables, \( X_2 \) represents time-dependent explanatory variables, and \( \beta_2 \) represents their effects at time \( t \).

I first present descriptive statistics by sex for each of the independent variables. Next, the bivariate relations among class origins, parental workplace freedom and control, adolescent employment, and arrest are shown. I then present multivariate models of arrest with and without the gender

². Hindelang et al. (1981) and Schore et al. (1979) report race differences in the correspondence between self-reported and official delinquency. Because the YDS data contain too few cases to estimate race-specific models, I acknowledge potential bias in the race coefficients and urge caution in generalizing about racial differences based on these models.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics by Sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEO-MARXIAN CLASS CATEGORIES (W1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourgeoisie</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>45.4%</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAMILY CLASS RELATIONS (W1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal authority</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal work intensity (hours per week)</td>
<td>22.98</td>
<td>21.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(18.59)</td>
<td>(18.63)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental freedom and control (0–10)</td>
<td>6.94</td>
<td>7.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.83)</td>
<td>(1.90)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAMILY STRUCTURE (W1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female-headed household</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADOLESCENT WORKPLACE POSITION (W4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent employed**</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>50.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work intensity (hours per week)</td>
<td>12.01</td>
<td>10.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12.14)</td>
<td>(13.38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biweekly earnings</td>
<td>$92.04</td>
<td>$89.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($97.62)</td>
<td>($121.12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adolescent freedom and control (0–10)</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td>6.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.05)</td>
<td>(2.02)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBSTANCE USE &amp; SCHOOL MISCONDUCT (W4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol use (0–7)**</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>3.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4.79)</td>
<td>(8.08)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent smoking**</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School misconduct (visits to principal/detention)**</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent dropout</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RACE: Percent White Race (W1)</td>
<td>65.9%</td>
<td>65.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05; ** p < .01 (two-tailed t-tests of mean equivalence).

NOTES: Sample size ranges from 437 to 547 for males and from 467 to 592 for females. The lower sample sizes are for questions asked only of adolescent workers (e.g., earnings). Standard deviations for continuous variables are in parentheses.
interactions specified by power-control theory. Finally, as a test for the robustness of the findings, the model is reestimated on retrospective self-report delinquency data.

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics by sex. The class distribution of YDS respondents is roughly comparable to Hagan et al.'s (1985) Toronto data, though the St. Paul sample includes a greater percentage of workers and fewer managers. In both samples, most respondents derive from worker and manager origins, with a smaller but significant number from employer, petite bourgeoisie, and surplus population classes. Approximately 26% of the girls' mothers employ or supervise others, relative to 20% of the boys' mothers. The parental freedom and control scale ranges from 0 to 10 with a mean of approximately 7 for both boys and girls. With regard to family structure, 23% of both boys and girls lived in a female-headed household (defined as a home with no father or stepfather present). For consistency with prior tests of the theory, the analysis is limited to two-parent households and differences between single-parent and two-parent samples are discussed in the notes.

Descriptive statistics for the time-dependent covariates are reported for 1991, when most respondents were in their senior year of high school. Although girls were more likely than were boys to work at this time, there were no significant sex differences in hours or earnings. Males reported greater alcohol use and more incidents of school misconduct than did females, though girls were more likely than were boys to smoke cigarettes. Approximately two-thirds of the respondents are white, and a dichotomous white/nonwhite indicator is used in multivariate analyses. 3

NONPARAMETRIC SURVIVAL ANALYSES

Figure 1 shows the survival distribution of arrest by sex. The curves show the cumulative proportion of male and female participants who remained arrest-free during the observation period. The survival curves show that males were much more likely to be arrested than were females, though arrest is relatively rare among the YDS sample. In 1991, when most of the participants were 17 or 18 years old, almost 98% of the females had not yet been arrested relative to about 92% of the males. This 6% gap widens over time to 14% in 1995 and almost 20% by the end of the observation period. Standard Log-rank and Wilcoxon tests for the equality of the male and female curves are rejected at $p < .001$ ($\chi^2 > 44$

---

3. Asian students comprise the next largest racial group (12%), followed by African Americans (9%), and those defining themselves as of mixed racial and ethnic background (5%).
with 1 degree of freedom), indicating a statistically significant sex difference in the survival functions. Plots of the hazard rate of arrest (not shown) show that the hazard rises initially, peaks in 1992 when most participants were 18 or 19 years old, and declines thereafter.

Figure 1. Survival Distribution of Time to Arrest by Sex

CROSS-CLASSIFICATION OF CLASS ORIGINS AND ARREST

Although the comparison of survival curves for males and females is informative, there are too few arrests in each class category to stratify these distributions by class as well as by sex. Before proceeding to multivariate models, however, I cross-classify social class origins with the hypothesized intervening and outcome variables. Table 2 shows the relations among social class categories and parental workplace freedom and control, youth work, and arrest. Parental workplace freedom and control differs significantly across the neo-Marxian class categories. Employers and the petite bourgeoisie report the greatest workplace freedom and control, workers and the surplus population report the least freedom and control, and managers fall between these extremes.

Adolescent labor force participation also varies significantly across class categories. Almost all of the adolescents from employer households were working during their junior or senior year of high school, relative to less than half of those with class origins in the surplus population. Class background, however, is less related to the quality of adolescent work; youth
Table 2. Employment, Workplace Control, and Arrest by Class Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parents' Class</th>
<th>Parents Freedom &amp; Control</th>
<th>Youth Percent Employed</th>
<th>Work &amp; Control</th>
<th>Percent Youth Arrested</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Diff.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employer (68)</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite Bourgeoisie (55)</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager (260)</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker (267)</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surplus (72)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² (d.f.) 141.5(32)** 41.2(4)** 24.2(32) 3.4(4) 3.4(4)

Gamma (γ) −.36 −.32 .002 −.04 −.01

F-ratio (d.f.) 25.0(4)** 0.3(4)

* p < .05; ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

NOTES: Results are for youth from two-parent families. Parental freedom and control scores for the surplus class are based on responses by 26 low-income working parents. Arrest outcome refers to arrests for economic offenses, alcohol and drug offenses, and other nonviolent offenses.

from all classes report levels of freedom and control comparable to working class parents.4

Prior research comparing official and self-report data suggests that those in the surplus population will be most subject to formal social control and those in the employer class will have the greatest immunity from official sanction. In their follow-up study of the Philadelphia birth cohort sample, for example, Wolfgang et al. (1987:105) found that lower status respondents reported only slightly more delinquency, though they had almost twice as many police contacts as middle and upper status subjects. Class differences in offending, however, do not appear to be obscured by official biases in the YDS sample. I find the greatest absolute rate of male arrest among children of the employer class (43%) as well as the greatest sex differential (34%). Although these results are consistent with power-control theory, other arrest patterns are less supportive, such as the greater gender gap among children of workers than among children of managers.

4. In his work on delinquency and age structure, Greenberg suggested that all juveniles in advanced capitalist economies share a common, if temporary, relationship to the means of production (1977:216).
Using self-reported delinquency data, Hagan et al. (1985) found support for Bonger's prediction that sex differences in delinquency diminish with each step down the class structure. Overall, the bivariate YDS results provide only partial support for a strict power-control interpretation of the relation between class background and crime. Neo-Marxian class categories are weak predictors of the arrest patterns of males and females and the gender gap in arrest. The analysis below provides a more refined test of the theory by simultaneously estimating the effects of maternal authority and family class position, statistically controlling for factors related to both arrest and employment, and modeling the timing of arrest.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

Table 3 presents estimates from multivariate proportional hazards models predicting the occurrence and timing of arrest among youth from two-parent families. Instead of neo-Marxian class categories, however, workplace freedom and control is measured directly at the household level. Model 1 includes sex, race, maternal work intensity, maternal authority position, and parental freedom and control. This model excludes the hypothesized sex interactions and shows the additive effects of parental workplace freedom and control and maternal authority to be nonsignificant. The exponentials of the parameter estimates in these models are interpreted in terms of relative risks, so that the 1.32 coefficient for male indicates that the hazard of arrest for males is 374% of the hazard of arrest for females in this model ($e^{1.32} = 3.74$). Similarly, the rate of arrest for whites is about two-thirds the rate for nonwhites, net of the other covariates ($e^{-0.42} = .66$).

Model 2 adds the interactions hypothesized by power-control theory (Hagan et al., 1985, 1987). Under the interaction coding, the maternal authority estimate gives its effect among females only. The hazard of arrest for females with mothers in authority positions is $e^{0.79}$ or about 2.4 times the corresponding hazard for girls whose mothers lack workplace authority, net of the family's overall level of workplace freedom and control, maternal hours of employment, and the other covariates. The significant interaction term indicates that this effect varies across the sexes. The

5. The substantive results are identical to those presented in Table 3 when single-parent families are included in the analysis, with the exception that the interaction between sex and youth freedom and control in Model 3 is marginally significant among the full sample. When the analysis is limited to single-parent households, maternal authority and parental freedom and control are closely related and the latter variable is no longer statistically significant. Although a three-way interaction among sex, maternal authority, and female headship is consistent with the theory, there are too few female arrests in the YDS data to model this pattern of interaction.
Table 3. Estimates from Proportional Hazards Models of Time to Arrest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White (vs. Nonwhite) (W1)</td>
<td>-.423*</td>
<td>-.387*</td>
<td>-.298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.224)</td>
<td>(.224)</td>
<td>(.268)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (W1)</td>
<td>1.316**</td>
<td>.239</td>
<td>-.927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.204)</td>
<td>(.852)</td>
<td>(1.137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal Work Intensity (W1)</td>
<td>.012*</td>
<td>.012*</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal Authority (W1)</td>
<td>.296</td>
<td>.879**</td>
<td>.862*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.206)</td>
<td>(.340)</td>
<td>(.382)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent Freedom/Control (W1)</td>
<td>-.028</td>
<td>-.178*</td>
<td>-.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.056)</td>
<td>(.104)</td>
<td>(.112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male*Maternal Authority</td>
<td>-.860*</td>
<td>-.817*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.435)</td>
<td>(.481)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male*Parent Freedom/Control</td>
<td>.204*</td>
<td>.122</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.123)</td>
<td>(.138)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Freedom/Control (tvc)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.167*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.093)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male*Youth Freedom/Control (tvc)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.279**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Intensity (hours) (tvc)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hourly Wages (tvc)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Misconduct (tvc)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.237**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.078)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Dropout (tvc)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.037**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.350)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinking (tvc)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.010)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smoking (tvc)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.679**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.222)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Observations 573 573 551
-2 Log Likelihood 1328.7 1323.1 1014.4
Generalized R² .09 .10 .16

* p < .05; ** p < .01 (directional tests).

NOTES: Results are for youth from two-parent families. Arrest outcome refers to arrests for economic offenses, alcohol and drug offenses, and other nonviolent offenses. tvc indicates a time-varying covariate.
maternal authority effect among males is obtained by deviating the interaction estimate from the female authority term and exponentiating \((e^{0.879-0.609}-1 = .02)\). Therefore, the net effect is close to zero for males in equations that control for maternal work intensity. Similarly, both the parental freedom and control effect and its interaction with sex are consistent with power-control theory—a negative effect on females and a weak positive effect on males. Thus, direct measures of freedom and control behave as predicted by Hagan et al. in the theory’s 1985 initial formulation, and maternal authority behaves as predicted in its 1987 revision. The most striking result from this model, however, is the strong effect of maternal authority on daughter’s arrest.

Because an adolescent’s workplace position may be negatively associated with preexisting propensity for deviance, I adjust adolescent work effects in Model 3 by including time-varying school misconduct, dropout, and substance use indicators. The effects of adolescent freedom and control imply that young males with greater freedom and control in the workplace are more likely to be arrested and young women with greater freedom and control are less likely to be arrested. Youth workplace position and the other indicators partially mediate the effects of parental freedom and control, reducing them to nonsignificance in Model 3.7

**Robustness of the Arrest Findings**

Because power-control theory is a theory of delinquency rather than arrest, the results above must be replicated on self-report offense data. Although the YDS did not collect such data initially, a retrospective self-report checklist was placed on the 1998 survey. For each question, respondents reported whether they had committed the act during their years in high school. The high school period was chosen to provide a “context cue” (Horney and Marshall, 1991) to orient respondents and because the theory was designed to explain delinquency rather than adult offending. Although recall problems are likely when data are collected 7 to 10 years

---

6. If socialization differs with maternal authority, the effects of youth workplace freedom and control among females may depend on maternal authority. Tests for a three-way interaction among sex, maternal authority, and youth freedom and control failed to detect a significant effect.

7. When missing values were imputed for parental employment (to test youth employment effects) and youth employment (to test parental employment effects), the effects in Table 3 held. I also estimated a bivariate probit selectivity model of youth employment and arrest (Uggen, 1999; Van de Ven and Van Praag, 1981) to further test these effects. Though the full interaction model could not be fit with this procedure, the results for maternal authority and parental freedom and control in trimmed models are substantively similar to those presented above.
after events may have occurred, Hindelang et al. (1981:80) report "impressive stability of the rankings of subjects" in self-reports over periods of up to 8 years. The self-report data are therefore useful for assessing the robustness of the arrest results.

Table 4 shows results from ordinary least-squares regression models predicting retrospective self-reported delinquency during the high school years. I initially created an 11-item summative index based on the following acts (the percentage reporting each act is noted in parentheses): theft less than $50 (34%), theft greater than $50 (14%), excessive speeding (48%), driving while intoxicated (25%), being drunk or high at work (13%), stealing from work (13%), unauthorized use of checks or credit cards (4%), breaking and entering (7%), hitting someone (37%), fighting (40%), and vandalism (25%). Results for this index, shown in Table 4,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>11-Item Index</th>
<th>8-Item Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.519**</td>
<td>1.708**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.692)</td>
<td>(.477)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White (vs. Nonwhite) (W1)</td>
<td>-.086</td>
<td>-.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.293)</td>
<td>(.202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (W1)</td>
<td>1.421</td>
<td>.518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.934)</td>
<td>(.644)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal Authority (W1)</td>
<td>.329</td>
<td>.500*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.330)</td>
<td>(.228)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal Work Intensity (W1)</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.007)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent Freedom/Control (W1)</td>
<td>-.095</td>
<td>-.110*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.090)</td>
<td>(.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male*Maternal Authority</td>
<td>-.551</td>
<td>-.800*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.510)</td>
<td>(.352)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male*Parent Freedom/Control</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.132)</td>
<td>(.091)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Observations 484

R² 0.076 0.072

* p < .05; ** p < .01 (directional tests).

NOTES: Results are for youth from two-parent families. The 11-item index includes theft less than $50, theft greater than $50, excessive speeding, driving while intoxicated, being drunk or high at work, stealing from work, unauthorized use of checks or credit cards, breaking and entering, hitting someone, fighting, and vandalism. The 8-item index excludes hitting, fighting, and vandalism.
failed to replicate the arrest findings. Neither maternal authority nor parental freedom and control had significant effects on the overall delinquency index, though the direction of these effects is consistent with power-control theory.

Although Hagan et al. included a battery indicator in their initial 6-item scale (1985:1162), much of the supportive evidence for the theory has focused on theft (Hagan and Kay, 1990; Hagan et al., 1990) or risk preferences more generally (Grasmick et al., 1996). Moreover, the relation between parental workplace position and adolescent violence is negative for males (Heimer, 1997), suggesting that power-control theory may be less applicable to violent or malicious behaviors. I therefore created an 8-item index that removed the hitting, fighting, and vandalism indicators. For this index of nonviolent offenses, the estimated effects of maternal authority are more consistent with power-control theory: Girls whose mothers hold authority positions committed more high school delinquency than did girls whose mothers lacked workplace authority, and significant sex differences in the effect of maternal authority again emerge. Though no sex difference is observed for the effect of parental workplace freedom and control, it remains a negative predictor of female delinquency.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

This study has specified and tested an intergenerational model of family class relations and crime based on power-control theory. The results highlight the continuing importance of power-control theory in explaining sex differences in crime and the potential explanatory power of youth employment conditions in translating status origins into deviant outcomes.

First, although household-level neo-Marxian class origins have only modest predictive power, direct measures of workplace freedom and control affect arrest as predicted by Hagan et al. (1987). Parental power and control in the workplace increases the rate of arrest among males and decreases it among females. Maternal authority position, in contrast, dramatically raises the risk of arrest among females and reduces this risk among males. Although these generalizations are limited to some extent by the crudeness of the arrest outcome, the pattern of results is reproduced on retrospective self-reports of high school delinquency. These results are notable in light of the general difficulties detecting and replicating interaction effects and the specific failure to detect them in most
One potentially troubling implication of this research is that young women whose mothers hold workplace authority are more likely to be arrested than are women whose mothers do not hold such positions. In fact, this is the strongest and most robust finding of the paper. Of course, girls whose mothers hold authority are not overrepresented at later stages of juvenile or criminal justice processing (Chesney-Lind and Shelden, 1998; Daly, 1994), because their social position also provides power to resist a deviant label. Further research is necessary to isolate the specific mechanisms linking maternal authority and daughter’s law violation. Nevertheless, the results are unlikely to be spurious due to parental time or supervision, because maternal authority effects hold when maternal work intensity is statistically controlled.

As Naffine (1987) has argued, a background assumption of much criminological research is the stereotypical notion that women act out of weakness and men act out of power. Power-control theory has been criticized as a “not-too-subtle variation on the ‘liberation’ hypothesis” with mother’s employment now causing daughter’s crime (Chesney-Lind and Shelden, 1998:120). From this perspective, the preceding analysis might be read as a variant proposing that mother’s authority position now causes daughter’s crime. In fact, the findings reported in this paper should not obscure a “brighter side” of power-control theory (Grasmick et al., 1996) that has too often been overlooked. Girls whose mothers hold workplace authority are likely to engage in risky prosocial as well as antisocial behavior, pursuing more extreme leisure pursuits and athletic competition, nontraditional employment, and entrepreneurial business and financial activity (Grasmick et al., 1996; see also Hanson and Kraus, 1998; Harris et al., 1998).

Cohort studies suggest that over the course of a man’s life there is almost a 50% chance that he will be arrested at least once (Wolfgang et al., 1987:76), and many successful adult males candidly confess to an adolescent “scare” with the law. The annual Monitoring the Future study of high school seniors shows that about 14% of males and 4% of females report an arrest within the past year alone (Bachman et al., 1996). If deviant behavior, law violation, and even arrest become a more normative part of the female transition to adulthood, it is conceivable that such deviance will also be associated with positively valued traits, such as assertiveness, career ambition, and occupational success.

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8. Jaccard et al. (1990:74) cite multicollinearity, measurement error, inappropriate metrics, small sample sizes, and model misspecifications as reasons that true interaction effects may go undetected or fail to be replicated if detected (see also Aiken and West, 1991).
This is not to suggest that maternal authority causes deviance, which, in turn, causes desirable outcomes. Instead, power-control theory predicts that maternal authority may affect a constellation of risk-taking behaviors that include prosocial conduct such as sports participation and entrepreneurship and antisocial behaviors such as crime and delinquency. In fact, the relation between law violation and positive outcomes is likely spurious by their common cause. The increasing number of women holding workplace authority has undoubtedly had many salutary effects on both their daughters and their sons (McCarthy et al., 1999). One potential byproduct of this trend, however, may be greater risk taking and nonviolent offending among their daughters.

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Schneider, Barbara and Jennifer A. Schmidt

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Simpson, Sally

Singer, Simon and Murray Levine

Smith, Douglas and Christy Visher

Spitze, Glenna

Stark, Rodney

Steinberg, Laurence

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Christopher Uggen is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Minne-
sota. His research addresses crime, law, and employment, with an emphasis on the
desistance process. His current research examines the socioeconomic determinants of
illegal earnings (with Melissa Thompson) and the civic consequences of felon disen-
franchisement (with Jeff Manza).