

Edwin Lemert 1967

Human Deviance, Social Problems, and Social Control

3 THE CONCEPT OF SECONDARY DEVIATION

In an earlier book¹ I proposed the concept of secondary deviation to call attention to the importance of the societal reaction in the etiology of deviance, the forms it takes, and its stabilization in deviant social roles or behavior systems. Sympathetic reception of the idea by a number of reputable sociologists and by unheralded teachers in the field has encouraged me to undertake further clarification of the concept and to articulate it with some of the newer ideas which have come out of sociological studies of deviance.

The notion of secondary deviation was devised to distinguish between original and effective causes of deviant attributes and actions which are associated with physical defects and incapacity, crime, prostitution, alcoholism, drug addiction, and mental disorders. Primary deviation, as contrasted with secondary, is polygenetic, arising out of a variety of social, cultural, psychological, and physiological factors, either in adventitious or recurring combinations. While it may be socially recognized and even defined as unde-

sirable, primary deviation has only marginal implications for the status and psychic structure of the person concerned. Resultant problems are dealt with reciprocally in the context of established status relationships. This is done either through *normalization*, in which the deviance is perceived as normal variation—a problem of everyday life—or through management and nominal controls which do not seriously impede basic accommodations people make to get along with each other.

Secondary deviation refers to a special class of socially defined responses which people make to problems created by the societal reaction to their deviance. These problems are essentially moral problems which revolve around stigmatization, punishments, segregation, and social control. Their general effect is to differentiate the symbolic and interactional environment to which the person responds, so that early or adult socialization is categorically affected. They become central facts of existence for those experiencing them, altering psychic structure, producing

specialized organization of social roles and self-regarding attitudes. Actions which have these roles and self attitudes as their referents make up secondary deviance. The secondary deviant, as opposed to his actions, is a person whose life and identity are organized around the facts of deviance.

Parentetically it needs comment that all or most persons have physical attributes or histories of past moral transgressions, even crimes, about which they are sufficiently self-conscious to have developed techniques for accepting and transforming, or psychologically nullifying degrading or punitive societal reactions. Recognition of this compromised state of mankind led Goffman in his sensitive analysis of stigma to hold that secondary deviation is simply the extreme of a graded series of moral adaptations, found among "normal" persons as well as those with socially obtrusive stigma.² I believe, however, that this overlooks the fact that stigma involves categorical societal definitions which depict polarized moral opposites, and also that self definitions or identities are integral in the sense that individuals respond to themselves as moral types.

Moreover, whereas Goffman addresses himself to the question of how persons manage stigma and mitigate its consequences, secondary deviation concerns processes which create, maintain, or intensify stigma; it presumes that stigma may be unsuccessfully contained and lead to repetition of deviance similar or related to that which originally initiated stigmatization. Also, it does not exclude the possibility that stigmatized deviance may be strategic, willful, or readily accepted as a solution to problems of the person standing in a stigmatized position.

The way in which a person presents himself in public encounters, particularly in an attenuated, pluralistic so-

ciety, does much to direct the kinds of reactions others make to him and by such means he protects cherished aspects of his identity. However, to dwell upon the cognitive, dramatic details of face-to-face interaction is to grapple with only part of the thorny question of secondary deviance. Over and beyond these are macrocosmic, organizational forces of social control through which public and private agencies actively define and classify people, impose punishments, restrict or open access to rewards and satisfactions, set limits to social interaction, and induct deviants into special, segregated environments.³

Although the ideas of personal adaptation and maladaptation rest uneasily in a kind of sociological limbo, the conception of primary and secondary deviance inclines thought in their direction, or at least toward some comparable terms. Their consideration makes it clear that awareness of unenviable features of the self is a complex rather than a simple reciprocal of societal insults to identity, and, further, that adaptations can turn into maladaptations on the person's own terms.⁴ This comes to light where efforts at validating the self are complicated by distinct feelings of hopelessness, entrapment, or loss of control over actions presumed to be volitional. These can be observed in certain forms of deviance best described as self-defeating; their peculiar, illogical manifestations speak of underlying difficulty or dilapidation in the communication process by which self and other are constituted.

THE SOCIETAL REACTION

The societal reaction is a very general term summarizing both the expressive reactions of others (moral indignation)

toward deviation and action directed to its control. In broad purview the societal reaction often presents a paradox in that societies appear to sustain as well as penalize actions and classes of people categorized as immoral, criminal, incompetent, or irresponsible. The tendency of societies to sustain deviance was recognized quite early by Durkheim and by Marx, and recently in more explicit statements by Dentler and Erikson, and Coser.⁵ Their line of thought emphasizes the functional necessity of deviance for promoting group solidarity, differentiating what is moral or goal-worthy, and for keeping society's defense mechanisms at standby readiness. Their propositions are commendable as general orientations to the study of deviance, but in my estimation do not account for secondary deviance and its variable emergence at different times and places. Explanations of the latter call for more detailed formulation of the processes by which societies create moral problems for deviants, define, and punish or reward the individual deviant's attempts to deal with such problems in a configuration of general life problems.

STIGMATIZATION

Stigmatization describes a process attaching visible signs of moral inferiority to persons, such as invidious labels, marks, brands, or publicly disseminated information. However, it defines more than the formal action of a community toward a misbehaving or physically different member. Degradation rituals, such as drumming the coward out of the regiment, administering the pauper's oath, diagnosing the contagious illness, and finding the accused guilty as charged may dramatize the facts of deviance, but their "success" is gauged less by their manner of enactment than by their prevailing consequences. The point is commonly illustrated by the initial court appearance of the errant

juvenile. The ancient ceremonial there may strike him with awe and fear, but if nothing much happens as a consequence, the memory fades or is retrospectively rationalized. Whatever the deviance, it remains primary.

An assertion, by no means new, is that for stigmatization to establish a total deviant identity it must be disseminated throughout society. Lecky spoke strongly on this point, contending that the solid front of public opinion against the "slightest frailty" among women in mid-nineteenth century England did much to add to the ranks of habitual prostitutes. To his view the "terrible censure" of opinion and the deep degradation of unchaste women caused the status of the prostitute to be irrevocable, and likewise contributed heavily to the associated crime of infanticide.⁷

Much the same thought was voiced by G. H. Mead, who first approximated a theory of criminal stigma in terms of the amount and kind of punishments inflicted upon law violators. His thesis, generically similar to Durkheim's, stressed the function of punishments in preserving group cohesion, but went further to show that deterrent punishments, conjoined with pursuit, detection, and prosecution, are incompatible with reinstatement of the criminal in society. Such a system, by suppressing all but aggressive attitudes toward the lawbreaker, effectively destroys communication and generates hostility in the criminal. Mead's conclusion, clearly a partial recognition of secondary deviance, was that a system of deterrent punishments not only fails to repress crime but also "preserves a criminal class."⁸

THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE

When scrutiny is narrowed to uncover the finer ways in which stigmatization fixes deviance and subjectively

incorporates a deviant version of the self, the notion of total stigma gives some difficulties. Mead held that impartiality, maximization, and the consistent application of punishment, expressed in the "fixed attitude towards the jailbird," provoked intransigence and hostility in the criminal. He seemed to take it for granted that such reactive antagonism led to further crime. To emphasize this interpretation he cited the individualized justice of the newly developed juvenile court as an example of alternative corrective procedures most suited to avoid stigmatization and the recidivism otherwise likely to flow from deterrent punishments.

Standing in contrast if not opposition to Mead's conception of stigma are the views of later writers who assert that inconsistent imposition of punishments is the prime factor which sets youth in criminal careers, largely through the arousal of a natural sense of injustice. This idea was originally brought forward in obscure reports appended to some of the numerous crime surveys carried out in American cities between 1920 and 1930. Pound, Osborn, Chaffee, Jr., Stern, and Pollak severally and jointly noted the prevalent confusion in jurisdictions, procedures, and philosophies within or between law administering agencies, and they concluded that this could be vital in diverting occasional youthful offenders into habitual crime, primarily through engendering a sense of unfairness.⁹

Not to be overlooked is the effect of unfairness upon the accused. Even if he is guilty there may be degrees of criminality which he may not have reached...but... if he feels deeply and justly that society...has behaved tyrannically and brutally...the natural effect of this emotion is to alienate him still further from the community and make him regard his criminal associates as the only ones who treat him decently. In consequence he may leave prison a bitter enemy of society, more

willful than before to continue a criminal career.

Recent writers such as Cloward and Ohlin, and Matza, pursue much the same thought, but also show how "undue deprivation" and the sense of injustice support or reinforce a sub-cultural ideology of delinquency.¹⁰ Matza holds the thesis, directly contradictory to Mead's that juvenile court procedure amounts to inconsistent punishment, that its very precept of individualized justice, when coupled with judicial arbitrariness and shifting group pressures reflected in court decisions, becomes from phenomenological perspective an affront to the charged youth's sense of the just.

The apparent contradiction that both consistency and inconsistency in the administration of punishments conduce to secondary deviance dissolves if several dimensions of inconsistency or, better, incommensurability, in punishments are recognized: (1) inconsistent or disproportion between stigma or punishments and the deviant attributes or actions toward which they are directed; (2) inconsistent applications of stigma or penalties to the same person at different times or places; and (3) inconsistent penalties or stigma applied to persons in the same jurisdiction or by the same law officials.

The definition of stigmatization as a collective process which necessarily misrepresents what a person has done and attacks his integrity permits the deduction that it "naturally" arouses feelings of injustice.¹¹ The fact that a wide variety of deviants—the physically handicapped, stutterers, homosexuals, drug addicts, alcoholics, mental patients, as well as delinquents and criminals—express such feelings turns empirical support to this hypothesis. But whether in fact a felt sense of unjust treatment at the hands of society in itself leads on to renewed deviance requires an order of assumptions many

sociologists would be unwilling to make. Perhaps it is best regarded as a precipitating factor in some but not all forms of secondary deviance. It becomes one of the problems imposed by the societal reaction. More important is the expression and structuring of such feelings, and their reception by others. While sub-groups and sub-cultural ideologies assume obvious importance here, I believe such subjective reactions are most profitably studied in a larger context of organized social control.¹²

SOCIAL CONTROL

The concept of stigma is burdened with certain archaic connotations suggesting tribal exclusion of unspecified provenience. These can be removed by starting with an updated version of deviance, more pertinent to contemporary society, as essentially consisting of problems of social control—an idea anticipated by Mead when he incidentally referred to the “modern elaborate development of the taboo.”¹³ The general principle at work is a simple one: when others decide that a person is *non grata*, dangerous, untrustworthy, or morally repugnant, they do something to him, often unpleasant, which is not done to other people. This may take shape in hurtful rejections and humiliations in interpersonal contacts, or it may be formal action to bring him under controls which curtail his freedom. The latter type of control has to have a rationale or a justification, but not necessarily to the entire society in which it occurs. In modern societies, where generalized public opinion and interest are absent, controls over deviants tend to be administered through welfare, punitive, or ameliorative agencies—specially organized for the purpose. Justification of their actions

devolves from larger moral ideologies, but it is more immediately derived from laws, policies, and administrative understandings. Versions of the deviant, his numbers in society, his putative characteristics, and his requirements become official, i.e., office-mediated.¹⁴

Among the requirements imposed on the deviant under some form of institutional restraint are that he accept or at least not threaten the dominant values of the responsible agency or the more specialized values of those strategically related to him within the organization. In order to become a candidate for reinstatement in society the deviant must give his allegiance to what is often an anomalous conception of himself and the social world, and try to live by rules, often rigorous in extreme, substituted for or added to those by which normals live.¹⁵ Denials of the organizational ideology or violation of these rules become utilizable¹⁶ confirmation for an official judgment that the deviant is “unreformed,” “still sick,” or “getting worse.” It is in such special socio-psychological environments that the functional expression of stigma is concretized and a staging area set up for an ideological struggle between the deviant seeking to normalize his actions and thoughts, and agencies seeking the opposite.¹⁷

The stabilization of deviance resulting from the superimposition of official interpretations of the deviant's responses to restrictive management is readily seen in criminal persistence of the prisoner who has been denied parole because he has come to be defined as a “trouble-maker” within the institution. Even more revealing of second order deviance is the revocation of parole for drinking, for getting married without permission of the parole officer, or leaving the local area for any of a variety of reasons which would be deemed entirely normal or

good for other, unstigmatized persons. Additional illustrations come from the juvenile court where in some areas a youth may be judicially reclassified and sent to an institution not because he has committed criminal acts but because he has flouted an order of the court or probation officer.

The history of the treatment of the insane furnishes equally revealing illustrations in which deviance emerges as an artifact of its control. During the period when, among other indignities, demented persons were chained to walls, it was assumed that chains were necessary to prevent maniacal attacks on others or self-destruction. With the rise of moral treatment in the early nineteenth century it began to be appreciated that exacerbations of insanity in large part derived from the restraints themselves and their animalistic implications for the patient. An early English medical man sympathetic to Pinel's new philosophy, cogently referred to the asylums of his day as “nurseries of madness,” specifically charging that the means of institutional control were those by which madness was made permanent.¹⁸

There is ground to apprehend that fugitive folly is too often converted into a fixed and settled frenzy, a transient guest into an irremovable tenant of the mind: an occasional and accidental aberration of the intellect into a confirmed and inveterate habit of dereliction: by a premature and too precipitate adoption of measures and methods of control...

Deeper insights into the nature of the interaction associated with then-current methods of control are provided by a Quaker physician of the era, who was impressed by the way in which it weakened self control.¹⁹

They who are unacquainted with the character of insane persons are very apt

to converse with them in a childish, or, which is worse, in a domineering manner... the natural tendency of such treatment is to degrade the mind of the patient, and to make him indifferent to those moral feelings which... strengthen the power of self restraint... and... render coercion in many cases unnecessary.

It is, of course, not difficult to transpose such ideas into the context of secondary deviance. Mentally disordered persons ordinarily enter or are committed to a hospital because their expressive behavior has made problems for others as well as for themselves. If this is assumed to reflect an inner struggle to retain self-control it can be seen why the mental hospital, which imposes a kind of moral orthodoxy with shifting criteria of compliance, makes it more rather than less difficult to normalize expressive behavior. Feelings of hostility or deep frustration which may be entirely appropriate to a situation in which a person is abandoned by his family, incarcerated, and compelled to live by a completely new or different set of rules can be expressed only at the risk of validating the deviant definition already placed upon the patient. Even more defeating is the official suspicion of the conforming patient, that he may be shamming, or that his is only an “institutional cure.”²⁰

Modern observations and research on the psychic impacts of mental hospital environments, while heedful of the demoralizing effects of degradation or “mortification of the self,” have disclosed the frequent occurrence of a functional analogue to the inconsistent punishment theory of criminal recidivism. Here I have in mind studies showing that conflicts and faulty communication among staff and custody people often are followed by an increase of disturbed behavior among patients and a rise in suicide attempts. This has been called “cognitive dis-

sonance." It may be interpreted several ways, one of which is that the confusion or uncertainties coming in the wake of institutional crises bring an "end of hope" in patients. Another way to see such phenomena is that they fracture the tenuous interpersonal ties on which patients must rely in their efforts to build some meaning into what to them is a meaningless world. If it is correct that normalization of the patient's actions requires relationships of trust with others, then the difficulties of normalizing interaction are implicit in the hospital situations. Staff people and attendants at best can offer verbal assurances of trust because administrative expediency and internal conflicts periodically destroy its substance.

SUB-CULTURE AND SECONDARY DEVIANCE

Most sociological research on mental hospitals deals with formal organization and staff-patient interaction, whereas sociological interest in prisons has concentrated on informal organization among the inmates and on the "prison community." Herein is met the difficulty of sociologically assessing the general importance of groups and sub-cultures in the growth of secondary deviance. That they are of undoubted significance has long been recognized, harking back to *Vidocq's Memoirs*,²² which is threaded with comments on the unsought consequences of imprisonment in the form of "moral contamination" and education in crime. In their survey of American prisons, Beaumont and de Tocqueville emphasized the extent to which the "corrupting discipline" of prisons had become a central issue in early nineteenth-century penology.²³ By the end of that century the

belief that reformatories spawned by the "institution craze" in England and the United States converted many less sophisticated youthful offenders into hardened criminals had strong partisans.²⁴

There is much to be found in the considerable accumulation of research and theory on inmate social systems and socialization in prison which supports the conclusion that incentives to rehabilitation and social reintegration advocated in American penal programs tend to be self-defeating.²⁵ Explanations for this have featured status degradation, which many indications show to be unavoidable—even in the best treatment-oriented prisons.²⁶ This is held to account for the growth or preservation of a deviant sub-culture within the prison. Administrative logistics favor this by determining that recidivists are more likely than others to be sent to institutions. There they dominate the prison world, control communication with staff and custody people, and successfully propagate an ideology that "you can't make it on the outside." To the newcomer without prior prison experience, old inmate ways and views not only operate as pressures to conform to the system but also offer predictable means of salvaging some dignity and self-respect from situations where they are in short supply.

Yet when all of this has been said, questions remain as to the relationship between inmate socialization and subsequent criminality on discharge from reformatories and prisons. Does new deviance spring from a continuing sense of injustice, which is reinforced by job rejections, police cognizance, and strained interaction with normals on the outside, or is it due to an acquired ideological view that this is what the world will be like when re-entered?

Does the latter, in turn, build into sensitivity and cause a projection of deviance expectancy in interaction, or does it lead discharged criminals to seek out companionship of delinquents, criminals and ex-convicts like themselves? On such questions research is less enlightening than it is on workings of the prison system.²⁷

While the enumerated possibilities are all attractive explanations for secondary criminal deviance, they do not readily apply to cases of "lone-wolf" type criminals, such as systematic passers of bad checks, who at most are only marginal participants in prison or criminal sub-cultures. Moreover, at the more general level of explanation, heed must be given to forms of deviance other than criminal, in which small group interaction and sub-culture are comparatively unimportant in the self-transformations of secondary deviance. The insane do not form groups, nor do stutterers, alcoholics, certain kinds of sex offenders, epileptics, or the poor. Further complication arises in the larger picture of drug addiction, in which some drug users participate in a criminal sub-culture but others, namely physician addicts, do not. The former tend to regard themselves as criminals, the latter do not. Yet both classes of drug users have no illusions about their status as addicts.²⁸

Obviously the nature of the deviance merits a par value with groups and culture in seeking the explanation of secondary deviance. The form of the deviance indicates a good deal about the necessity for deviant group formation and participation, whether it be a means to an end, or whether the necessity is expressive as an "end in itself." Groups become instrumentally important in those forms of deviance which require for their systematic or continued activation goods and services

provided by others through specially organized relationships. Prostitution in modern society well illustrates such deviance,²⁹ as do gambling, confidence games, and political radicalism. Homosexuality, although practicable through seducing normals, generally requires partners of similar inclinations. Armed robbery, or the "heist," can be carried out single-handed, but it is done most efficiently and profitably in groups created for the purpose.³⁰ In contrast to these forms of deviance, the stutterer can and does have his speech spasms in any audience, and an alcoholic can surreptitiously find ways and means to pursue his drinking in a wide variety of conventional groupings. Finally, the pauper, the sick, and the physically handicapped find their means of survival through legitimized organizations established by society.

Whether the expressive needs of deviants require specialized group participation and sub-cultural definition is more difficult to determine. The case seems strongest for certain kinds of criminals, such as con men, whose high degree of technical differentiation sets them apart from other criminals as well as from society. Prostitutes frequently experience conflicts about their identities, which appear to be most easily solved through relationships with pimps, or, in some instances, through homosexual relationships. Political radicals also seem to require association with like persons as audiences to validate the "ideological purity" important to differentiating or culturing their identities.³¹ However, at the other extreme are the mentally disordered, who, outside of hospitals at least, tend to be threatened psychologically by the presence of others with a comparable stigma. Sub-groups are irrelevant to stuttering because stutterers are usually unable to express

themselves consistently to their own satisfaction in any group.

THE POSITIVE SIDE OF NEGATIVE IDENTITIES

That which may be overlooked in the discussion of deviant identities is the way in which they can be assumed and sustained through antagonistic or degrading interaction with agents of respectable society as well as by accommodations and solidarity with deviant associates. A fuller consideration of the former points to various situations or conditions where negative identities, i.e., those generally stigmatized, may offer temporary or relatively stable solutions to life problems despite the fact that they represent a lower order of human existence. This makes it important to examine more closely the ways in which a deviant status or role gives access to rewards and satisfactions.

If effective stigmatization imposes penalties, and circumscribes access to conventional means of life satisfactions, it may also provide new means to ends sought. Thus becoming an admitted homosexual ("coming out") may endanger one's livelihood or his professional career, but it also absolves the individual from failure to assume the heavy responsibilities of marriage and parenthood, and it is a ready way of fending off painful involvements in heterosexual affairs. To be sent to a camp for delinquent boys is degrading and a career threat, but at the same time it may be an avenue of escape from an intolerable home situation where degradation is greater. To be committed to a mental hospital is a blot on one's reputation, but it may be one sure way of stopping a divorce action by a straying spouse, the out-

come of which would be even more intolerable.³²

THE LIMITS OF DEGRADATION

There are at least two salient reasons why stigmatized persons may seek and find gratifications as well as having to endure painful humiliation and frustrating restrictions associated with a deviant status. One has to do with the dialectical qualities of cultural values, public policy, laws, and social control, the other with the complex ways in which personal evaluations are made of things and experiences objectively represented as rewarding or punishing.

A wider view of many forms of deviance shows that they frequently tend to be integrally connected with cultural dilemmas in which generic forms of human action potentially lead to either social approval or social disapproval or both. Among these, for example, are sexual provocativeness in females and sexual aggressiveness in males, both of which are culturally approved or encouraged as the means by which high-order values of the family, religion, or property are conserved. However, such sexuality is disapproved when it results in illegitimate births, prostitution, incest, spread of disease, or internal conflict and demoralization within tightly integrated functional groups. Although the consequences of the latter must be condemned and their participants stigmatized for conservative reasons, the persons involved cannot be ignored socially thereafter. The unwed mother and her bastard child must be supported, and the diseased prostitute treated, if for no other reason than to protect society from further evil consequences. Hence, private or public organizations come to their aid or suc-

cor. The effects of this are to assign them definitive status and to validate a claim on the services of others, or more simply, to make possible a way of life. While transition to such status may be initiated by moral condemnation, social rejections, and penalties, it is completed by charitable justifications, acceptance, and provision of the material prerequisites of survival.³³

Dual moral ideologies, combining rejection with rehabilitative actions directed to social reinstatement also mitigate public reactions to alcoholics, drug addicts, criminals, physically handicapped persons, and the poor. The accretion of special meanings which attach to ameliorative services, and their subversion to ends other than those intended often explain why deviant statuses may be more amenable than they are or than can be officially represented. Organized social control of deviance, as with social control in general, at most has a marginal influence on the interactional processes which give it existential meaning. Collective efforts to organize systems of rewards and punishments to repress deviance and promote reformation along expected lines are always subject to vicissitudes of interpretation, diversion, and cooptation of agents of authority at their points of intervention in social interaction.

LAW, POLICY, AND SOCIAL CONTROL

The idea that society's efforts to alleviate social problems of deviance through the establishment of public policy may aggravate or perpetuate the problems is by no means novel. The adverse consequences of the corn laws in early Roman society in producing "sloth" and further poverty did not

escape the notice of such commentators as Cicero, and beginning with sixteenth century England, the idea that pauperization and dependency were largely the hedonistic consequences of public policy set by the Poor Laws came to be widely accepted by critics.³⁴ Much of the succeeding history of public and private charity to the present time has turned on the issue of how, in institutional terms, to "insure that people who are not provided for by the usual economic arrangements of society shall be maintained and yet not incapacitated for future participation in the organized economic system."³⁵

While the nineteenth-century hedonistic explanations of pauperism are unacceptable from a sociological perspective, nonetheless the possible importance of calculational factors cannot be summarily set aside in a sufficient analysis of secondary deviance—particularly in those problems of deviance which have identifiable economic features. This stands out in sharpest relief where a demand is created for illegal goods and services, illustrated on the grand scale by public prohibition of the consumption of alcoholic beverages, and to a lesser degree in current legal repression of prostitution, gambling, and the unlicensed use of narcotic drugs. Stringent enforcement of laws against these forms of deviance, called crimes without victims by one writer, can be presumed to make the forbidden goods and services more difficult to secure and also to raise their costs. This in turn lays a basis for the growth of an entrepreneurial sub-culture offering opportunities of status and income for criminal deviants. At the same time problems are built up for the customer seeking a supply of the goods or services; he has to participate in the criminal sub-culture for his purposes, and he may have to expend time

and money ordinarily allocated to established or conventional claims on his budget. If he is strongly motivated, as with persons addicted to alcohol, drugs, or gambling, he may neglect his family, alienate his friends, and beyond this, engage in outright criminal activity to finance his costly habit.³⁶

A good deal has been written on the contribution which repressive laws make to the "problem" of narcotics in the United States, especially as sources of illegal traffic in drugs and the commission of crimes by addicts in order to supply themselves with drugs. Yet it remains to be shown that the laws themselves cause addiction; more plausible are the assertions that laws and policy determine access to drugs, their forms of use, the attributes of the addict population, their degree of contact with criminals and other deviants, their involvement in other deviance, and the particular kind of self-conception held by addicts.³⁷ From these must be teased out the more generic factors which underlie or sustain addiction. Needless to say, after this has been done, it would be totally unrealistic to ignore the peculiar physiological effects of the drugs in the making of an addict. Furthermore, in this and other forms of deviance there remains a knotty problem of assigning relative weights to the factors assumed relevant, determining their mutual effects and the order in which they occur. The solution for this methodological problem traditionally has been held by many sociologists to lie in the concept of process.

PROCESS AND SECONDARY DEVIANCE

The most general process by which status and role transitions take place is socialization. As it has been applied to the study of deviants the concept

has been further circumscribed to designate such processes as criminalization, prisonization, "sophistication," "hardening," pauperization, addiction, conversion, radicalization, professionalization, and "mortification of self." All of these speak in varying degrees of a personal progression or differentiation in which the individual acquires: (1) morally inferior status; (2) special knowledge and skills; (3) an integral attitude or "world view"; and (4) a distinctive self-image based upon but not necessarily coterminous with his image reflected in interaction with others.

The earliest descriptions of deviant socialization current in sociology came from Shaw's documents on delinquent careers. These were likened to natural histories and so titled, but their descriptive content was derived from the delinquent's "own story," as related to an interviewer.³⁸ From a present-day perspective these studies appear to have been colored by Shaw's unconcealed interest in reform and the probable interest of the respondent in supporting Shaw's views. Valuable as the stories were and still are for certain purposes, they carried unavoidable overtones of nineteenth-century entrepreneurial ideology in reverse, resembling "sad tales," or reminiscent of Hogarth's rake's progress, or early moral propaganda tracts which portray prostitution as the "road to ruin."

The deviant career concept also has been linked with or partly derived from an occupational model, examples of which are found in the descriptions of criminal behavior systems, such as thieving, and the marginal deviance of dance musicians.³⁹ The occupational parallel, of course, can be demonstrated in the professionalization of some types of thieves, prostitutes, political radicals, vagrants, bohemians (beatniks), beggars, and to some extent the physically

handicapped. In contrast to these, however, there is little indication of an occupational orientation among alcoholics, mentally disordered persons, stutterers, homosexuals, and systematic check forgers.

Closer examination of the career concept suggests that its application to deviance should be guarded. I doubt, for example, that the notion of "recruitment" of persons to most kinds of deviance can be any more than a broad analogy. While learning specialized knowledge from other deviants is a condition of some deviance, it is not so for all, and the notion that deviants serve an "apprenticeship" may be more figurative than literal where it is applicable. A career denotes a course to be run, but the delineation of fixed sequences or stages through which persons move from less to more serious deviance is difficult or impossible to reconcile with an interactional theory. Furthermore, no incontrovertible evidence has yet been marshaled to justify the belief that prodromal signs of deviance exist—either in behaviors or in personality syndromes such as "pre-delinquent," "prepsychotic," or "addiction-prone." The flux and pluralism of modern society make concepts of drift, contingency, and risk far more meaningful in deviance than inevitability or linear progress.

A more defensible conception of deviant career is that of recurrent or typical contingencies and problems awaiting someone who continues in a course of action, with the added notion that there may be theoretically "best" choices set into a situation by prevailing technology and social structure. There is some predictive value of a limited or residual nature in concepts like "turning points" or "points of no return," which have been brought into the sociological analysis of careers. These allow it to be said that persons

having undergone certain changes will not or cannot retrace their steps; deviant actions act as social foreclosures which qualitatively change meanings and shift the scope of alternatives within which new choices can be made.⁴⁰ Even here a caveat is necessary, for alcoholics, drug addicts, criminals, and other deviants do sometimes make comebacks in the face of stigma, and an early history of deviance may in some instances lead to success in the conventional world.

DRIFT, CONTINGENCY, AND DISCOVERY

While some fortunate individuals by insightful endowment or by virtue of the stabilized nature of their situations can foresee more distant social consequences of their actions and behave accordingly, not so most people. Much human behavior is situationally oriented and geared to meeting the many and shifting claims which others make upon them.⁴¹ The loose structuring and swiftly changing facade and content of modern social situations frequently make it difficult to decide which means will insure ends sought. Often choice is a compromise between what is sought and what can be sought. Finally, even more important, situations and the actions involved often are defined after they occur, or late in the course of interaction when formal social controls intrude. Where deviance is a possible contingency, delayed definition is more likely than early.

All of this makes me believe that most people drift into deviance by specific actions rather than by informed choices of social roles and statuses. Each of such actions has its consequence and rationale and leaves a residual basis for possible future action depending on the problems solved or

the new problems brought to life. From the societal side, repetition of deviant action may be ignored or normalized by those who are thereby threatened, or it may be compounded through patronage of associates who have something to gain from it. The pimp may encourage his new female conquest in her belief that she is entertaining men for pay because she "loves him so." The family of the heavy-drinking man erects perceptual defenses against seeing his action as alcoholism because they, like him, are distressed by this ascription of meaning. The ideological gulf between stereotypes of good and bad, acting in concert with prevalent medical conceptions of deviance as the symptom of a defective or "sick" personality strengthens such normalizing tendencies by inhibiting recognition of similarities between the primary deviant and stigmatized persons. Meantime they allow the drift to deviance to go on.

This may proceed from one of two kinds of psychological states: in one the individual has no prior awareness that such actions are defined or definable as deviant; he must learn or must apply the definitions to his attributes or actions.⁴² In the other the person already has learned the definitions but progressively rationalizes or dissociates them from his actions. Unequivocal perception of a deviant self comes when the person enters new settings, when supportive (normalizing) interaction with intimates becomes antagonistic, or when contact is made with stigmatizing agencies of social control. In other cases internal changes or changes in the feedback of meanings from the actions themselves bare the new self.⁴³

Whether the imputation of self-characteristics, or "labeling" in itself initiates or causes deviant acts is something of a moot point. The possibility cannot be arbitrarily ruled out, but it moves onto questionable grounds where social

reality is made coterminous with ideas and symbolic representations. Erik Erikson, not to be designated as an idealist, speaks of changes from positive to negative identities which result from societal diagnosis by the "balance of us." This is illustrated by the mother who constantly berates her daughter as "immoral," "no good," or "tramp." The girl in time may yield to the derogatory self-image because it is nearest and "most real" to her. Yet Erikson is careful to say that this may be only a final step in the acquisition of a negative self-image, and he also refers to the necessity of confirming changes in identity.⁴⁴ I take this to be a way of saying that there must be some basis for validating a degrading self-conception in prior acts, to which I would add that it also needs subsequent overt acts to clothe it with social reality. Such acts may be fortuitous or they may be deliberate in origin, but in any case they conclude with some manner of interpersonal involvement or commitments. More complete data collected in actual cases similar to the hypothetical case in question often disclose that the girl takes some precipitant action, such as running away from home, is then arrested and handled in a way to confirm the mother's expectation. Even more tangible confirmation transpires if, as may happen, she is picked up by strange men who take her in charge and exploit her sexually.

While an abiding deviant self demands validation and reinforcement in social interaction, it overdraws the social to insist that self-discovery always has immediate antecedents in participant social interaction dramatizing good and evil. Revelations may be little more than solitary moments of disenchantment, points at which a fabric of rationalizations collapses in the face of repeated contradictions from cumulative experiences. The alcoholic looks at

his dirty clothes, shabby hotel room with a scattered array of empty bottles, and realizes the pretense that he is "between jobs," or still the best auto salesman in town is just pretense and nothing more. The check forger finally throws away a book listing his victims and with it the idea that he will someday repay the sums he has carefully noted by their names. The form of the deviance, the situation, and the flow of meaning in face-to-face interaction undoubtedly have great importance in normalizing action and supporting perceptual defenses against the slow stain of deviation, but the logic of self-discovery is an inner one.

THE SECONDARY DEVIANT

Devaluation of the self on society's terms ordinarily has a sequel of internal or psychic struggle, greatest where the sense of continuity of the self is massively threatened. Some persons never move beyond this state, overtly striving to conform at times, at others entangling themselves with deviance. Terms like "unorganzied" or "transitional" deviance may be apt descriptions of their actions for certain purposes. Assuming that the person moves further toward deviance, the abatement of his conflicts usually follows discovery that his status as deviant, although degraded is by no means as abysmal as represented in moral ideologies. The blinded war veteran learns that blindness is not a stark tragedy but more like a "damned nuisance," and that life is possible, particularly if a lot of "charitable" people would leave him alone. The prostitute soon realizes that her new life is sometimes rough and unpredictable, and that arrest is a hazard, but it is not a life of shame. Having discovered the prosaic nature of much of his life under a new status,

the deviant, like other people, usually tries to make out as best he can.⁴⁵ What happens will be conditioned by several factors:^{45a} (1) the clarity with which a role or roles can be defined; (2) the possession or acquisition of attributes, knowledge, and skills to enact, improvise, and invent roles; and (3) the motivation to play his role or roles.

A great deal can be said, mostly illustrative, about the first two items. Confidence men, for example, have clearly defined occupational roles in a criminal world, but not many persons are recruited to the roles because they lack the requisite skills and knowledge for this exacting form of thievery. In decided contrast, there are few or no specialized roles available to stutters, save perhaps that of a clown or an entertainer. Fashioning their own roles is difficult because effective speech is a requirement for most social roles. Consequently they are reduced to filling conventional occupational roles usually below their educational or skills level, becoming, in a figurative sense, ridiculous or strangely silent hewers of wood and haulers of water. Somewhere between the two extremes of confidence men and stutterer is the drug addict, most of whom in our society are excluded from conventional occupations and tend to be excluded from professional or organized criminal pursuits. However, they may elect to be petty thieves, burglars, prostitutes, hustlers, stool pigeons, or choose to peddle drugs to other addicts.

While the social roles available to deviants vary in number, kind, and degree of stigmatization there is always some basis for adaptation or a modus vivendi open to the deviant. Moreover, attributes can be faked or concealed and some measure of skills and knowledge learned, whether they be means of filling the leftover, low-status roles of conventional society or those more

explicitly defined as immoral or criminal. Such conclusions furnish the more pertinent one that secondary deviance to a large extent becomes a phenomenon of motivation.

MOTIVATION AND LEARNING

If motivation to exploit the possibilities of degraded status and to play a deviant role are critical aspects of transition to secondary deviance, then analysis is pushed toward some form of learning theory, preferably one which accounts for the variable social meanings of satisfactions, rewards, and punishments. This enters an area little trod by sociologists and to some extent looked upon as an alien if not sterile preoccupation of psychologists. Yet notwithstanding the criticism that the laws of learning have been largely formal and devoid of content, the outlook is less bleak than sometimes pictured—particularly where efforts have been made to bring together dynamic personality theory and ego-psychology with newer formulations of the learning process.

If nothing else, common sense dictates that some variant of the law of effect be made part of the explanation of secondary deviance. This is true even in the face of the formidable task of specifying what is rewarding or punishing to human beings, whose actions in contrast to those of the rest of the animal world are complicated by symbolic learning and delayed gratification. Restated and applied to deviance, the law of effect is a simple idea that people beset with problems posed for them by society will choose lines of action they expect to be satisfactory solutions to the problems. If the consequences are those expected, the likelihood that the action or generically similar action will be repeated

is increased. If the consequences are unsatisfactory, unpleasant, or make more problems than they solve, then the pattern of action will be avoided.⁴⁶ The fact that anticipation of satisfactions or expectation of punishments is a cognitive process based upon symbolic learning as well as experience does not vitiate the principle of effect; it only reasserts the longstanding need to show how individuals evaluate their own responses in a world where the accommodations of others become means to ends. The absence of any well worked-out theory for doing this leaves the field open to several propositions which may be suitable for further study of the process of evaluation connected with secondary deviance.

1. Defining one's self as deviant is instrumental in seeking out means of satisfaction and mitigating stigmatization. The redefinition of self leads to reinterpretation of past experiences, which in turn reduces inner tensions and conflict. Ends and means are more easily sorted out, and personal accommodations established necessary to utilize available alternatives.

2. The value hierarchy of the degraded individual changes in the process of which ends become means and means become ends. Conventional punishments lose their efficacy with loss of status. Experiences at one time evaluated as degrading may shift full arc to become rewarding. The alcoholic is an example; deeply ashamed by his first stay in jail, he may as years go by come to look upon arrest as a means of getting food, shelter, and a chance to sober up.

3. Persons who renounce higher status are less affected by the promise of remote satisfactions and more by those within their immediate ken. This is related to the degree of degradation, and also to incarceration or hospital sojourns which determine the point in personal life cycles at which evaluations are made. Deprivation and long experience with

highly specific systems of sanctions within control institutions reinforce a world view of the attainable over the achievable.

4. Once deviance becomes a way of life the personal issue often becomes the costs of making a change rather than the higher status to be gained through rehabilitation or reform. Such costs are calculated in terms of the time, energy, and distress seen necessary to change.

SELF-DEFEATING DEVIANCE—THE NEUROTIC PARADOX

Thus far I have offered a sociological brief for some form of neo-hedonistic theory of secondary deviance. Baldly reduced, it says that persons become secondary deviants because they manage to find more satisfactory solutions to their problems through deviance than through non-deviance; the nature of their problem solving differs because degradation and newly perceived contingencies change their conceptions of what is satisfying. Maintenance of deviance once established is explained in much the same way, with the added observation that perceived costs of change introduce elements of conservatism into the processes of evaluation. The impression is left that secondary deviance ensues from problem-solving action which is complicated by status loss and changes in value hierarchies but still not generically different from other human problem solving.

There are, however, some forms of recurrent deviance which reflect disturbances in the problem-solving and perceptual process itself, in which irresolution rather than solution of problems emerges as the key factor in deviance. In such deviance there is no easily discoverable or even inferable balance of pains and pleasures; indeed, there is much in the self-initiated actions of the individual which con-

tinually generates pain, hardship, defeat, and degradation, with little compensatory satisfaction. These are kinds of self-defeating, self-perpetuating behaviors, whose persistence defies common sense logic, whose baffling manifestations led Freud to several revisions of his thinking, and which present a discomfiting challenge to learning theory partisans.

The deviant patterns in question range from ordinary "bad habits," through vices and addictions to those which get labeled or formally diagnosed as neurotic or psychotic. Those singled out for a basis of discussion here are stuttering, systematic check forgery, alcoholism, and drug addiction. They are marked by the almost total absence of any durable pleasure in the persons involved. Instead their lot is one of gnawing anxiety, pain, unhappiness, and despair, in some cases ending with deterioration or suicide. Some writers have referred to such deviance as vicious circles in that they repeat a continuous chain of cause and effect, beginning with deviance and ending with deviance. Seen in this way they readily qualify as classic cases of secondary deviance.

The earliest speculations on self-defeating deviance dealt with what can be described as a hiatus, blocking, or constriction of the cognitive process. Even before Freud had spoken in English on the subject, F. M. Alexander, an obscure practitioner concerned with psychic aspects of disease, postural abnormalities, and speech defects, had theorized that they were aggravated or preserved by faulty ideas of causation; consequently efforts of afflicted individuals to eliminate their bad habits became the very means by which they were kept alive or made worse.⁴⁷ John Dewey generously credited Alexander for several important ideas which he took to form his well-known function-

alist thesis that bad habits (idling, gambling, and addiction to drugs and alcohol) are not merely negative failures to act according to social norms but rather are functional responses sustained through interaction in social situations. Efforts to break out of vicious circles become integrated parts of the habits themselves and act as trigger mechanisms.⁴⁸

The hard drinker who keeps thinking of not drinking is doing what he can to initiate the acts which lead to drinking. He is starting with the stimulus to his habit.

Both Freud and Adler were aware that a social context with access to rewards had a part in preserving ways of living they considered neurotic. Adler spoke of the rewards which motivate "neurotic invalidism,"⁴⁹ and Freud discerned a similar phenomenon which he designated "advantage through illness." In so doing he used language strongly reminiscent of the concept of reinforcement.⁵⁰

When such mental organization as the disease has persisted for a considerable time, it displays something like a self-preserved instinct. It forms a kind of pact, a *modus vivendi* with other forces in mental life, even those fundamentally hostile to it, and the opportunities can hardly fail to arise in which it once more manifests itself as useful and expedient, thus acquiring a *secondary function* [italics mine] which again strengthens its position.

Freud's biological orientation, however, made the reality principle something less than social; he assigned only marginal significance to that which I have called secondary deviance, preferring to treat its expressions as products of irrational symptom formation and not "real" solutions. In so doing he

inaugurated confusion between stabilized deviance and the neurotic paradox. At the same time he obscured his own vision by pursuing only the inner dynamics of "symptoms."⁵¹

It is not by chance that one of the more challenging efforts to elevate symptoms of inner conflict to their proper level of importance in the study of self-defeating deviance should come from the pen of a leading student of speech disorders. Here I refer to Van Riper's deeply insightful analysis of adult stuttering, which in many respects represents the "pure case" of secondary deviance.⁵² I say this because stuttering thus far has defied efforts at causative explanation. It appears to be exclusively a process-product in which, to pursue the metaphor, normal speech variations, or at most, minor abnormalities of speech (primary stuttering) can be fed into an interactional or evaluational process and come out as secondary stuttering.⁵³

Van Riper contends, in essence, that symptoms, which Freud set to one side, stand for an important segment of the self. In stuttering they are neurotic mannerisms which originate as defensive reactions to the penalties which our culture imposes upon those individuals whose nonfluency is excessive. It is the stuturer's efforts to avoid his own defensive actions, i.e., the stuttering self, which feed back into and maintain the disordered speech. So long as he keeps trying to be what he knows he isn't—a normal speaker—his problems continue. Only by equating the self with the stuttering symptoms can change be brought about.

In more detail, Van Riper shows that stuttering is both rewarding and punishing to the person, and characteristically it generates ambivalence, or "approach-avoidance"⁵⁴ reactions to speaking; efforts to speak are accom-

panied by a rising level of anxiety which phases into panic when the speech blocks occur. Termination of the blocks, which stutterers can predict, are rewarding because they put an end to the anxiety. However, the rewarding sense of relief also reinforces the blind struggle actions or specific acts immediately preceding their end. These, of course, are the very actions which distort the speech rhythms.

This analysis has much in common with more recent statements of learning theory, such as Mowrer's "two factor" process, which separates problem solving from the effective consequences of the attendant action.⁵⁵ From a broader overview it indicates that human beings, ordinarily purposeful agents exercising an endowment of choice within the limits of their culture, get manoeuvred or manoeuvre themselves into cyclical impasses in which acute anxiety takes command, constricts the cognitive, self-defining processes and ephemerally reduces learning to a desperate hedonistic level.

There is much here that is applicable to other forms of self-defeating deviance, particularly if the concept of phases or cycles in which punishment and rewards alternate is seen in various time dimensions. A related view of cycles in the drinking of alcoholics develops similar ideas. Thus intoxication is both rewarding and punishing; and it proceeds from ambivalence, with a surrender to drinking following rising anxiety. Intoxication becomes an immediate reward through reducing the anxiety, but as it continues it begins to produce highly painful episodes or frightening illness. The end of a drunk is rewarded in a number of social situations which have a common effect of protecting the alcoholics from "aversive stimuli."⁵⁶ Social support at this time also rewards expressions of guilt and

remorse and purely verbal adaptations such as good resolutions, which leave the cognitive aspects of self and action untouched, or they provide new facets to a complicated system of rationalizations relied upon by the drinker to deny his alcoholic self.

Elsewhere in this volume I have included a chapter on the cyclical changes in the actions of the systematic check forger, which seeks to enlighten the dynamic relationships between role enactment, anxiety, and identity in perpetuating the curious self-defeating features of this pattern of crime. While Lindesmith and Strauss have seriously questioned the applicability of learning theory to the explanation of drug addiction,⁵⁷ nevertheless, a study of cycles of abstinence and relapse in drug addicts offers some data which seem entirely amenable to the general kind of analysis which I have urged here.⁵⁸ In time, more detailed ethnographic studies of the daily patterns of life of drug addicts, touching on sequences and timing of activities such as "coping," "hustling," "scoring," and "shooting," may bring into better focus the interplay of satisfactions and penalties in patterns of drug use. A beginning of this kind of research has already been made in investigations of drug addiction in certain areas of New York City.⁵⁹

DEVIANCE AS IDENTITY PROBLEMS

The most telling objection to learning theory which seeks for constant or direct referents of human choice in social experience is that inner urgencies, strivings, "emitted behavior," and autonomous motives extrude themselves in human action. In the process, rewarding actions may be discontinued, and unrewarding or even punishing

ones are pursued in blind folly. Grand examples are the forewarned missionary who rashly treads on sacred beliefs and customs of alien natives until he is ignominiously killed and his body desecrated, or the dictator who wages war hopelessly until he pulls his nation down in a crashing Wagnerian finale.

A more immediate or microcosmic analogue of the Wagnerian epic may be re-enacted by the alcoholic who repeatedly downs whiskey only to have it come up as vomit, and who feels no relief, and even sicker, when he finally gets some to remain in his angry stomach. It is also mimed by the drug addict who continues with drugs even though acquired tolerance eliminates the possibility of any longer achieving a "high," or who is using so much heroin that he can no longer hope to beg, buy, or steal a supply sufficient for his "habit." The check forger adds to the piece when he mechanically cashes his bogus checks knowing that arrest and prison are only a step away.

It can be said that the alcoholic and the drug addict have endogenous cravings, and that the bad check artist has a compulsion which drives him, or even that the stutterer has a need to stutter.⁶⁰ Be this as it may, I prefer to believe that cravings are inferable functions of social reality at least in part. I judge them to be related to (1) the degree of personal involvement in deviance, and (2) the duration of such involvement. The totally long-involved drug addict is illustrative; he has in the course of time introduced narcotics into all or most facets of his life; he has used them night and day, at home and at work, on foot and in automobiles, and in many toils of the land. He has injected arms, legs, knees, and other parts of his body, and he has sniffed and swallowed drugs. When this has gone on for years in countless social situations, the administration of

narcotics, their imagery, and their concomitant feeling states become, to employ a common sense term, "second nature." This means that narcotics have become bound up in complex, intermeshing ways with his physiological, psychological, and social reactions which in the large form a supplementary self. In the same way it is possible to discern an alcoholic self, a stuttering self, or a check artist self, identified with the body, material artifacts, and surroundings, as well as the social environment.⁶¹

Cravings or compulsions by definition are only observable in persons who have been deprived, and, I would add, in ways significant for the self. Those living for some time in alien cultures are known to experience feelings of loss of identity, and they also periodically crave foods, drinks, movies, newspapers, and other appurtenances to their former daily routines of existence which anchored them to their native identities. If the sober alcoholic, the abstaining drug addict, the stutterer in remission, and the check criminal "going straight" are seen as akin to persons living in an alien culture or foreign psycho-social environment, their cravings and compulsions lose some of their mystique. They become the cumulations of irritability which grow with new responsibilities or problems confronted without old accouterments of the self. Alcoholics speak of the strain of staying sober, drug addicts of the crankiness and meanness of their "off drug" personality, the check writer of his boredom with humdrum workaday life while on parole.

A net conclusion from what has been said is that self-defeating deviance at times must be understood as the complex consequences of an identity crisis. In phenomenological language the crisis is the outcome of a dialectic between two major self-systems, the

"true" self and a "false" self.⁶² The adaptive devices making up the false self-system have an ephemeral "pay off" or allow the deviant to "get by," but the satisfactions, or perhaps protection, gained thereby are compromised or tainted by an accompanying sense of bad faith, insincerity, and unjustified or undeserved gains. Conversely it may be that false self-systems interfere with the experiencing of guilt arising from real as opposed to phantasiad transgressions, and prevent restorative actions (restitution) which would help to structure the self in social interaction and reduce some of the acute anxiety which underlies self-defeating deviance.

While considerable has been written on the subject of identity problems, much of it has been in a phenomenological or existential mode of thought. Searching out the referents of such problems in social situations and social structures is mandatory if the concept is to have utility for sociological studies of deviance. In a general way it can be shown that modern mass society is characterized by a shrinking inventory of life situations in which identities can be stabilized. The demands and expectations of others increasingly tend to get defined in terms of mere overt conformity or the appearance of such. Along with this, opportunities for substantiating rewards through interpersonal action diminish, as do those for venting moral indignation. Finally, the practice of restitution declines and gives way to public protection or insurance, and the expiation of sins or wrongs done others has become archaic, or is replaced by impersonally organized treatment of deviants as sick people exempt from blame. Beyond these observations, however, lies a more arduous sociological assignment of specifying the situational and structural contingencies related to

identity crises in particular kinds of deviance.⁶³

CONCLUDING COMMENTS ON SECONDARY DEVIANCE

The concept of secondary deviance unavoidably strikes a strong conservative note in contemporary sociology. It is more than a little reminiscent of the dour philosophy of William Graham Sumner, in that it starts with a jaundiced eye on collective efforts of societies to solve problems of deviance, particularly when this work of social control is propagandized as primarily in behalf of the deviants. As such, "secondary deviance" may be a convenient vehicle for civil libertarians or young men of sociology to voice angry critiques of social institutions.

In part the underlying issue is the old one of rights of individuals versus necessities of collective life, aggravated and sharpened by the great power delegated or pre-empted by the state and the jumbo organizations in modern society. The coexistence of older philosophies and procedures of punishments with a positivistic, psychiatric ideology enjoining treatment of social deviants sanctions an order of power not far removed from the divine right of kings; it makes possible a pious scientific tyranny in which social control is justified less by an individual's demonstrable threat to society than by someone's authoritative judgment of his potential menace. One result is that persons whose moral infractions have been minor can face indentured public servitude of indefinite termination.

Perhaps all of this means that a high energy society mediated by a delicately integrated technology can ill afford to risk granting unqualified statuses to persons of doubtful integrity or competence. Fortunately there are trends

which counter this stringent conception of societal necessities and promise re-allocation of power to individuals. One of these is the renewed interest of social scientists in social control as such, which conceived as a marginal intrusion into human affairs, must raise questions of the advisability of such intervention, the when and the where of intervention, and its consequences, sought and unsought.

Another reassuring counterdevelopment has come from high-court decisions, which on one hand have sanctioned large grants of power to public organizations, but on the other have made it unequivocally clear that abridgment of freedom of individuals by state or private organizations shall meet procedural requirements designed to equalize powers of contestants at the points where the decisions are made.

Finally, the preservation of civil libertarian values has been furthered by federal and state clarifications of rules of administrative law. In this area, little known to sociologists, it is possible to see the early growth of a more functional kind of morality, especially where it embraces the licensing and regulation of business, professions, and occupations. While moral turpitude implied by criminal conviction and apparent disabilities of mental disorder, alcoholism, and drug addiction can be legislated into prima facie evidence for disqualifications of status, the procedural tendencies in administrative adjudication have been to require demonstration on a functional basis that past deviance does or will effectively threaten welfare of particular public clienteles served by the deviant. In time such administrative judgments may crystallize a wider democracy for deviants and evolve organizational devices for hedging the process by which degradation is translated further into

denials, suspensions, and revocations of the right to follow one's livelihood.⁶⁴ Hopefully, there may come the time when a larger class of degraded persons will have the right to appeal from non-functional stigmatization by organizations. Sociologically this means that amplification of deviance handicaps at the level of status will be diminished. Whether the identity problems of deviants can be approached through comparable organized activity or legal change is doubtful.

NOTES

1. Edwin M. Lemert, *Social Pathology* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1951), pp. 75 f.

2. Erving Goffman, *Stigma* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 127.

3. John Kitsuse and Aaron Cicourel, "A Note on the Uses of Official Statistics," *Social Problems*, 11 (1963), 131-39.

4. On this point see Messinger's criticism of Goffman. Sheldon Messinger, "Life as a Theatre," *Sociometry*, 25 (1962), 98-109.

5. Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1949), pp. 99-103; Robert Dentler and Kai Erikson, "The Functions of Deviance in Groups," *Social Problems*, 7 (1959), 98-107; Lewis Coser, "Some Functions of Deviant Behavior and Normative Flexibility," *American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (1962), 172-81. The reference to Marx is found in Coser's article.

6. Garfinkel's article on the subject, while a succinct discussion of the requirements for successful denunciation of deviants, does not consider what happens or must happen afterwards. Harold Garfinkel, "Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies," *American Journal of Sociology*, 61 (1956), 420-24.

7. William Lecky, *History of European Morals* (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1955), pp. 282-86.

8. George H. Mead, "The Psychology of Punitive Justice," *American Journal of Sociology*, 23 (1928), 577-602.

9. See Roscoe Pound's summary in the *Cleveland Crime Survey*, (Cleveland: Cleveland Foundation, 1922), pp. 585 ff; also

Alfred Bettman, "Confusion of Concepts," *National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement: Report of the Prosecution* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1931), pp. 161-66; the excerpt is from Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., Walter Pollak, and Carl Stern, "Unfairness in Prosecutions," *ibid.*, p. 268.

10. Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin, *Delinquency and Opportunity* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1960), pp. 117-21; David Matza, *Delinquency and Drift* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964), Chap. 4; see also Allen Barton and Saul Mendlovitz, "The Experience of Injustice as a Research Problem," *Journal of Legal Education*, 13 (1960), 24-39.

11. For a discussion which derives the sense of injustice from natural law see Edmond Cahn, *The Sense of Injustice* (New York: New York University Press, 1949); whether natural laws need to be invoked is debatable. It is equally plausible to argue that a sense of justice is learned in primary group experiences, or that it reflects one of what Cooley called the primary group values.

12. It may be that the sense of distrust, or that one is a distrusted person, cuts across a wider population of deviants, and does more to explain their alienation. It indicates to the stigmatized person the ominous magnitude of his problem, not only the large number of social positions from which he is likely to be excluded, but also his difficulties of normalizing interaction.

13. Mead, *op. cit.*, p. 589.

14. For a study of official commitments of the mentally ill in this vein, see Thomas Scheff, "The Societal Reaction to Deviance: Ascriptive Elements in Psychiatric Screening of Mental Patients in a Midwestern State," *Social Problems*, 11 (1964), 401-13.

15. The ultimate example of these is found in prisons. In a list of forty punishable rule violations held to in one state prison only six corresponded to what would be misdemeanors or felonies outside of the prison. See Harry Barnes and Negley Teeters, *New Horizons in Criminology* (3rd ed.) (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959), p. 365; also, see an older discussion: Frank Tannenbaum, "The Professional Criminal," *The Century Magazine*, 110 (1925), 581-82.

16. I prefer the term "utilizable" because it favors a more dynamic view of the institutional environment. Rather than seeing the impact of an institution on inmates as "total," based on routinized interaction, it is preferable to look at its origins in the

shifting, variable administrative, therapeutic, and custodial actions, keeping in mind that (1) conflict abounds among staff and custody people, and (2) staff and custody people have problems and are often defensively oriented. The important fact is that these people have total power if they decide it must be used. However, total power is qualified by the fact that no institutional system has ever been devised which can destroy informal communication of inmates. See Robert Sommer and Humphry Osmond, "The Schizophrenic No-Society," *Psychiatry*, 25 (1962), 244-55.

17. See Julius Roth, "The Treatment of Tuberculosis as a Bargaining Process," in *Human Behavior and Social Processes*, ed. Arnold Rose (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962), Chap. 31; Max Siporin, "Deviant Behavior in Social Work Diagnosis and Treatment," *Social Work*, 10 (1965), 59-67; Sethard Fisher, "The Rehabilitative Effectiveness of a Community Correctional Residence for Narcotic Users," *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*, 56 (1965), esp. 192 ff.

18. John Reid, "Essays on Insanity, Hypochondria and Other Nervous Affections" (London: Longmans, Green & Company, Inc., 1816), cited in Richard Hunter and Ida Macapine, *Three Hundred Years of Psychiatry* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 724; the philosophy of moral treatment originated with Philippe Pinel, *A Treatise on Insanity*, trans. D. D. Davis (1806), cited by Hunter and Macapine, *op. cit.*, pp. 602-10.

19. Samuel Turk, "Description of the Retreat, an Institution near York, for Insane Persons of the Society of Friends" (1813), cited in Hunter and Macapine, *ibid.* p. 696.

20. A superintendent of a midwestern mental hospital once commented ruefully in the presence of the writer, "These damned patients feign sanity."

21. See Ezra Stotland and Arthur Kobler, *Life and Death of a Mental Hospital* (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1965); William Caudill, *The Psychiatric Hospital as a Small Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958); R. Boyd, S. Kaegles, and M. Greenblatt, "Outbreak of Gang Destructive Behavior on a Psychiatric Ward," *Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases*, 120 (1954), 338-42; Jack Brehm and Arthur Cohen, *Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1962).

22. Vidocq, *Memoirs*, ed. and trans.

Edwin Rich (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1935).

23. Gustave de Beaumont and Alexis de Tocqueville, *On the Penitentiary System in the United States and its Application in France* (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1964), Chap. 2, esp. p. 55.

24. William Tallack, *Penological and Preventive Principles* (London: Wertheimer, Lea and Co., 1896), pp. 342-48.

25. Richard Cloward, "Social Control in Prison," in *Theoretical Studies in Social Organization of the Prison*, Pamphlet 15 (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1960), p. 28.

26. Gresham Sykes and Sheldon Messinger, "The Inmate Social System," *ibid.*, p. 13.

27. For a beginning of research and discussion on this general problem see Stanton Wheeler, "Socialization in Correctional Communities," *American Sociological Review*, 26 (1961), 697-712.

28. Charles Winick, "Physician Narcotic Addicts," *Social Problems*, 9 (1961), 174-86.

29. James Bryan, "Apprenticeships in Prostitution," *Social Problems*, 12 (1965), 287-97.

30. Everett DeBaun, "The Heist—The Theory and Practice of Armed Robbery," *Harpers*, February, 1950, pp. 65-76.

31. Egon Bittner, "Radicalism and Radical Movements," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (1963), 928-40.

32. This has been referred to as a "psycho-social moratorium." More simply it is a form of delaying action not an uncommon resort in human affairs. See Harold Sampson, Sheldon Messinger, Robert D. Towne, et al., "The Mental Hospital and Marital Ties," *Social Problems*, 9 (1961), 141-55.

33. See Kingsley Davis, "Illegitimacy and Social Structure," *American Journal of Sociology*, 45 (1939), 215-33.

34. See J. R. Pretyman, *Dispauperization* (London: Longmans, Green & Company, Ltd., 1878), Sections I-III.

35. Helen Witmer, *Social Work, An Analysis of a Social Institution* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1942) p. 128. Generally it has been held that the poor laws had a direct effect of creating and perpetuating poverty by discouraging thrift and encouraging marriage and reproduction. However, the poor law study reports reveal much emphasis placed on intervening factors, such as lack of clarity in the laws, their inconsistent interpretation, and cor-

rupt administration. For example, publicans elected to Boards of Guardians sometimes insisted that outdoor relief be given to habitués of their houses. See *Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress* (London: Wyman & Sons, Ltd., 1909), Chaps. 1-6.

36. Edwin Schur, *Crimes Without Victims* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965); Alfred Lindesmith, *The Drug Addict and the Law* (Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana Press, 1965).

37. Alfred Lindesmith and John Gagnon, "Anomie and Drug Addiction," in *Anomie and Deviant Behavior*, ed. Marshall Clinard (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1964), p. 159.

38. Clifford Shaw, *The Jack Roller* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930). Goffman uses the concept "moral career" as a broad orientation to changes over time basic and common to persons in a social category. He regards it as a two-sided perspective which shifts back and forth between the self and its significant society. Erving Goffman, "The Moral Career of the Mental Patient," *Psychiatry*, 22 (1959), 123-42.

39. E. H. Sutherland, *The Professional Thief* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937); Howard Becker, *Outsiders* (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), Chaps. 5, 6; C. Cambor, Gerald Lesowitz, and Miles Miller, "Creative Jazz Musicians: a Clinical Study," *Psychiatry*, 25 (1960), 1-15; Raymond Mack, "The Jazz Community," *Social Forces*, 38 (1960), 211-22.

40. See Lemert *Social Pathology*, Chap. 4; also Becker, *op. cit.*, Chap. 2; for a careful evaluation and critique of attempts to predict delinquency; see Jackson Toby, "An Evaluation of Early Identification and Intensive Treatment Programs for Predelinquents," *Social Problems*, 13 (1965), 161-75.

41. The concept of drift comes from Matza, *op. cit.*, Chap. 1, esp. pp. 27-30.

42. Lindesmith, of course, has held that opiate addiction depends upon learning that withdrawal symptoms can be alleviated by taking more opiates. Alfred Lindesmith, *Opiate Addiction* (San Antonio, Tex.: Principia Press, 1947). A study of teen-age drug users in New York found that lack of deterrent information was a factor in willingness to try heroin. However, shift to regular use was explained on the basis of a need. In some cases youths began regular use after one shot, saying in effect, "This is what I have been waiting for all my life."

While such a person might be "hooked" in a figurative sense, the full social and physiological implications of addiction come later when he becomes a "frantic junkie." Isidor Chein, Donald Gerard, Robert Lee, and Eva Rosenberg, *The Road To H* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1964), Chap. VI.

43. Tannenbaum, whose early ideas came close to a statement of secondary deviance, believed that delinquency was the outcome of a hardening process observable in conflict of youthful gangs with police and with other gangs. In the process, new definitions get placed on their actions. This, of course, was a forerunner of the subcultural, learning conception of delinquency. Frank Tannenbaum, *Crime and The Community* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), esp. pp. 19-22; More recent views, such as those of Sykes and Matza, direct attention to the coexistence of conventional as well as criminal values, in the delinquent youth, his ambivalence, and resolutions of the ambivalence through a process of neutralization. Gresham Sykes and David Matza, "Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency," *American Sociological Review*, 22 (1957), 664-70; David Matza and Gresham Sykes, "Juvenile Delinquency and Subterranean Values," *American Sociological Review*, 26 (1961), 712-19.

44. Helen Witmer and Ruth Kotinsky, eds. *New Perspectives on Delinquency*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, No. 56 (1956), pp. 1-23.

45. This may be likened to playing a game with new and not very favorable rules. Tannenbaum described it in connection with the professional criminal; "After a while he accepts it (the game) as a matter of course. He bargains upon the amount of freedom he may have, hopes for escape, for total freedom from arrest, but bargains with fate and gives hostages to freedom, calculates his chances and accepts the inevitable with stoicism." Frank Tannenbaum, *The Professional Criminal*, *op. cit.* p. 584.

45a. I am indebted for these ideas to William Robinson who some years ago in a seminar at UCLA suggested them as a parsimonious summary of Leonard Cottrell's article, "The Adjustment of the Individual to His Age and Sex Roles," *American Sociological Review*, 7 (1942), 617-620.

46. The law of effect was originally stated by the psychologist, E. L. Thorndike. For a discussion of his principle and learning theory in general, see O. Hobart Mower, *Learning Theory and Behavior*

(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960), Chap. I.

47. F. M. Alexander, *Man's Supreme Inheritance* (London: E. P. Dutton, 1910).

48. John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: Modern Library, Inc., 1930), p. 35.

49. Alfred Adler, *Understanding Human Nature* (New York: Greenberg Publishing, Inc., 1927; pp. 200-207).

50. Sigmund Freud, *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, trans. Joan Riviere (New York: Garden City Publishing Co., 1943), p. 334.

51. Actually, Freud's illustration of advantage through illness—the crippled workman who becomes a beggar and accepts a dole—nicely outlines the problem of secondary deviance in social terms. He observes that the beggar's position is supported by that which destroyed his old life. To remove the disability would remove his livelihood and leave the question as to his ability to resume his old work. *Idem.*

52. Charles Van Riper, "Symptomatic Therapy for Stuttering," in *Handbook of Speech Pathology*, ed. Lee Travis (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957), Chap. 27.

53. Wendell Johnson, "Perceptual and Evaluational Factors in Stuttering," *Handbook of Speech Pathology*, Chap. 28; C. S. Bluemel, "Primary and Secondary Stammering," *Proceedings of the American Speech Correction Association*, 2 (1932), 295-302; Charles Van Riper, "The Growth of the Stuttering Spasm," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 23 (1937), 70-73.

54. See Joseph Sheehan, "Theory and Treatment of Stuttering as an Approach-Avoidance Conflict," *Journal of Psychology*, 36 (1953), 27-49.

55. Mower, *op. cit.*, esp. Chaps. 3, 9.

56. Elaine Kepner, "Application of Learning Theory to the Etiology and Treatment of Alcoholism," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, 25 (1964), 279-91.

57. Alfred Lindesmith and Anselm Strauss, *Social Psychology* (rev. ed.) (New York: Dryden Press, 1956), pp. 361-65.

58. Marsh Ray, "The Cycle of Abstinence and Relapse Among Heroin Addicts," *Social Problems*, 9 (1961), 132-40.

59. Isidor Chein, Donald Gerard, Robert Lee, and Eva Rosenfeld, *The Road to H* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1964), Chaps. III, VI.

60. Lee Travis, "The Need for Stuttering," *Journal of Speech Disorders*, 5 (1940), 193-202.

61. So-called "plastic involvement" of the self was once illustrated for the writer by an ex-addict who told of the scene preceding his marriage. He had put his "works" (spoon, eyedropper, pin) on the table in his room to which he had asked his bride-to-be. Asked if she knew what that was she said yes. He replied, "Well, that's me, and if you marry me, you marry that, too."

62. R. D. Laing, *The Divided Self* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1965), Chap. 6.

63. The distinction between the status

problem in secondary deviance and the identity problem and relation of the latter to "problems implicit in paternalistic mission culture" is admirably documented by Earl Rubington, in "Grady Breaks Out: A Case Study of an Alcoholic's Relapse," *Social Problems*, 11 (1964).

64. See Lawrence Friedman, "Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing, 1890-1910: A Legal and Social Study," *California Law Review*, 53 (1964), 487-534.

II *Deviation and Social Control*