STATE of Connecticut
v.
Santos MIRANDA.
No. 15467.
Argued Dec. 2, 1997.
Decided June 30, 1998.
Defendant was convicted in
the Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven, Fracasse, J., of risk of
injury to child and assault in the first degree, and he appealed. The Appellate Court, Foti, J., 41
Conn.App. 333, 675 A.2d 925, affirmed conviction
for risk of injury to child, but reversed conviction for assault in the first
degree. On grant of certification, the
Supreme Court, Katz, J., held that: (1)
failure to act can create liability under first degree assault statute, and (2)
defendant had duty to protect his live-in girlfriend's child from abuse.
Reversed and remanded.
Palmer, J., concurred and
filed opinion in which McDonald, J., joined.
McDonald, J., concurred in
part and dissented in part and filed opinion.
Berdon, J., dissented and filed opinion.
**681*210 Robert J. Scheinblum, Assistant State's Attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael
Dearington, State's Attorney, and Elpedio
Vitale, Assistant State's Attorney, for appellant
(State).
Susan
M. Cormier, Hartford, with whom was Bageshree
Ranade, Legal Intern, for appellee (defendant).
Mario
T. Gaboury filed a brief for the Center for the
Study of Crime Victims' Rights, Remedies and Resources, University of New
Haven, as amicus curiae.
Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and
BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and McDONALD, JJ.
**682
KATZ, Associate Justice.
The issue in this appeal
is whether a person who is not the biological or legal parent of a child but
who establishes a familial relationship with a woman and her infant child,
voluntarily assumes responsibility for the care and welfare of the child, and
considers *211 himself the child's stepfather, has a legal duty to
protect the child from abuse, such that the breach of that duty exposes the
person to criminal liability pursuant to General
Statutes § 53a- 59
(a)(3). [FN1] After a court trial, the defendant, Santos
Miranda, was convicted of six counts of assault in the first degree in
violation of § 53a-59 (a)(3), [FN2] and one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of
General
Statutes § 53-21. [FN3] The court concluded that the defendant had
established a familial relationship with the victim and her mother, that his
failure to help and protect the child from abuse constituted a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the
situation, and that such reckless conduct resulted in serious physical injuries
to the child. The trial court found
the defendant not guilty of nineteen counts of assault in the first
degree. Those counts had charged him
with either personally inflicting the injuries or not preventing the child's
mother from inflicting the injuries. [FN4] The court *212 imposed a total
effective sentence of forty years imprisonment.
FN1. General
Statutes § 53a-59 provides in relevant part: "Assault in the first
degree: Class B felony: Nonsuspendable sentences. (a) A person is
guilty of assault in the first degree when ... (3) under circumstances evincing
an extreme indifference to human life he recklessly engages in conduct which
creates a risk of death to another person, and thereby causes serious physical
injury to another person...."
FN2. The
defendant was convicted of two counts of unspecified reckless conduct, two
counts of reckless conduct by allowing the victim to live in a situation of
child abuse and two counts of reckless conduct by failing to take measures to
prevent the child from living in such a situation.
FN3. General
Statutes § 53-21 provides:
"Injury or risk of injury to, or impairing morals of,
children. Any person who (1) wilfully
or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of sixteen years to be
placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such child is endangered,
the health of such child is likely to be injured or the morals of such child
are likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to impair the health or
morals of any such child, or (2) has contact with the intimate parts, as
defined in section 53a-65, of a child under the age of sixteen years or
subjects a child under sixteen years of age to contact with the intimate parts
of such person, in a sexual and indecent manner likely to impair the health or
morals of such child, shall be guilty of a class C felony."
FN4. Although the
trial court never stated who actually had caused the injuries, we take judicial
notice that the child's mother entered a plea
of nolo contendere to the crimes of intentional assault in the first degree and
risk of injury to a minor. She
received a sentence of twelve years incarceration suspended after seven years.
The defendant appealed to
the Appellate Court, which affirmed the conviction for risk of injury to a
child, [FN5] but reversed the assault convictions concluding that the
defendant had no legal duty to act under the circumstances of this case. State
v. Miranda,
41 Conn.App. 333, 341, 675 A.2d 925 (1996). This court granted the state's petition for
certification limited to the following issue:
"Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court
properly conclude that the defendant could not be convicted of violating General
Statutes § 53a-59 (a)(3) because he had no legal duty to protect the victim from
parental abuse?" State
v. Miranda,
237 Conn. 932, 677 A.2d 1372 (1996). We conclude that, based upon the trial
court's findings that the defendant had established a familial relationship
with the victim's mother and her two children, had assumed responsibility for
the welfare of the children, and had taken care of them as though he were their
father, the defendant had a legal duty to protect the victim from abuse. [FN6] Accordingly, **683
we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
FN5. The Appellate
Court refused to consider the sufficiency of the evidence claim on the risk of injury count on
the basis that it had been briefed inadequately. State
v. Miranda,
41 Conn.App. 333, 338, 675 A.2d 925 (1996).
FN6. The defendant
does not claim on appeal that the trial court's findings of fact were clearly
erroneous. See Crowell
v. Danforth,
222 Conn. 150, 156, 609 A.2d 654 (1992)
("The trial court's findings are binding upon this court unless they are
clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record as a
whole.... We cannot retry the facts or
pass on the credibility of the witnesses." [Internal quotation marks omitted.] ). We, therefore, accept those findings for purposes of this appeal.
As set forth in its
memorandum of decision, the trial court found the following facts. The defendant commenced living with his
girlfriend and her two children *213 in an apartment in September,
1992. On January 27, 1993, the
defendant was twenty-one years old, his girlfriend was sixteen, her son was
two, and her daughter, the victim in this case, born on September 21, 1992, was
four months old. Although he was not
the biological father of either child, the defendant took care of them and
considered himself to be their stepfather. He represented himself as such to
the people at Meriden Veteran's Memorial Hospital
where, on January 27, 1993, the victim was taken for treatment of her injuries
following a 911 call by the defendant that the child was choking on milk. Upon examination at the hospital, it was
determined that the victim had multiple rib fractures that were approximately
two to three weeks old, two skull fractures that were approximately seven to
ten days old, a brachial plexus injury to her left arm, a rectal tear that was
actively "oozing blood" and bilateral subconjunctival nasal hemorrhages. On the basis of extensive medical evidence,
the trial court determined that the injuries had been sustained on three or
more occasions and that none of the injuries had been the result of an
accident, a fall, events that took place at the time of the child's birth,
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, a blocked air passageway or the child choking on
milk. Rather, the trial court found
that the injuries, many of which created a risk of death, had been caused by
great and deliberate force.
The trial court further
found in accordance with the medical evidence that, as a result of the nature
of these injuries, at the time they were sustained the victim would have
screamed inconsolably, and that her injuries would have caused noticeable
physical deformities, such as swelling, bruising and poor mobility, and
finally, that her intake of food would have been reduced. The court also determined that anyone who
saw the child would have had to notice these injuries, the consequent
deformities and her reactions. Indeed,
the trial court *214 found that the
defendant had been aware of the various bruises on her right cheek and the
subconjunctival nasal hemorrhages, as well as the swelling of the child's head,
that he knew she had suffered a rectal tear, as well as rib fractures
posteriorly on the left and right sides, and that he was aware that there
existed a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the child was exposed to
conduct that created a risk of death.
The trial court concluded that despite this knowledge, the defendant
"failed to act to help or aid [the child] by promptly notifying
authorities of her injuries, taking her for medical care, removing her from her
circumstances and guarding her from future abuses. As a result of his failure to help her, the child was exposed to
conduct which created a risk of death to her and the child suffered subsequent
serious physical injuries...."
The trial court concluded
that the defendant had a legal duty to protect the health and well-being of the
child based on the undisputed facts that he had established a familial
relationship with the child's mother and her two children, that he had
voluntarily assumed responsibility for the care and welfare of both children,
and that he considered himself the victim's stepfather. On the basis of these circumstances, the
trial court found the defendant guilty of one count of § 53-21 and six
counts of § 53a-59 (a)(3). [FN7]
FN7. The
issue on appeal was limited to the question of whether the defendant had
breached a duty to protect the child victim.
The parties have raised the issue of whether the evidence was sufficient
to support the assault convictions, however, we leave that issue to the
Appellate Court on remand.
I
[1] Before
addressing the certified issue of whether the facts and circumstances of this
case were sufficient to create a legal duty to protect the victim from parental
abuse pursuant to § 53a-59 (a)(3),
we turn our attention to the question of whether, even if we assume such a *215
duty exists, the failure to act can create liability under that statute.
In other words, by failing to act in
accordance with a duty, does a defendant commit a crime, such as assault in the
first **684 degree in violation of § 53a-59 (a)(3),
that is not specifically defined by statute in terms of an omission to act but
only in terms of cause and result? [FN8] Whether a failure
to discharge a legal duty to protect a child constitutes an omission punishable
as an assault is a question of law subject to de novo review by this court. State
v. Solek,
242 Conn. 409, 419, 699 A.2d 931 (1997).
FN8. In recognition
of the broad term "engage in conduct," as chosen by the legislature in § 53a-59 (a)(3),
suggesting at least the want of due care, the failure to respond and the
disregard of responsibility, the defendant does not claim that the plain
language of the statute precludes criminal liability from attaching to an
omission to act when there is a legal duty to do so. Nor does the defendant challenge the long-standing and
fundamental principle that "conduct" can include the failure to act
when there is a duty to act. 1 W.
LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (1986) § 3.3(a).
The trend of
Anglo-American law has been toward enlarging the scope of criminal liability
for failure to act in those situations in which the common law or statutes have
imposed an affirmative responsibility for the safety and well-being of
others. See generally 1 W. LaFave
& A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (1986) § 3.3; annot., 61
A.L.R.3d 1207 (1975); annot., 100
A.L.R.2d 483 (1965). Criminal liability of parents based on a failure to act in
accordance with common-law affirmative duties to protect and care for their
children is well recognized in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., People
v. Stanciel,
153 Ill.2d 218, 180 Ill.Dec. 124, 606 N.E.2d 1201 (1992) (mother guilty of homicide by allowing known abuser to
assume role of disciplinarian over child);
Smith
v. State,
408 N.E.2d 614 (Ind.App.1980) (mother held
criminally responsible for failing to prevent fatal beating of child by her lover);
State
v. Walden,
306 N.C. 466, 293 S.E.2d 780 (1982) (mother
guilty of assault for failure to prevent beating); State
v. Williquette,
129 Wis.2d 239, 385 N.W.2d 145 (1986) (*216
mother guilty of child abuse for allowing child to be with person known
previously to have been abusive and who subsequently abused child again). [FN9] In light of this
duty to protect and care for children, courts in these jurisdictions have
concluded that, where this duty exists and injury results, the failure to
protect the child from harm will be "deemed to be the cause of those
injuries" and the person bearing the duty may face criminal
sanctions. State
v. Peters,
116 Idaho 851, 855, 780 P.2d 602 (1989).
FN9. The attempt by
Justice Berdon in his dissent to undermine our reliance on these cases in his
discussion of whether we can recognize a common-law duty to protect a child
from abuse misses their import. Despite
the presence of statutes in those cases, the courts address at length the
inherent duty of parents to provide for the safety and well-being of their
children, noting that this duty has long been recognized by the common law as
well as by statute. See, e.g., State
v. Walden,
supra, 306 N.C. at 475, 293 S.E.2d 780
("[W]e believe that to require a parent as a matter of law to take
affirmative action to prevent harm to his or her child or be held criminally
liable imposes a reasonable duty upon the parent. Further, we believe this duty is and has always
been inherent in the duty of parents to provide for the safety and welfare of
their children, which duty has long been recognized by the common law and by
statute."); State
v. Williquette,
supra, 129 Wis.2d at 255, 385 N.W.2d 145
("[i]t is the right and duty of parents under the law of nature as well as
the common law and the statutes of many states to protect their children"
[internal quotation marks omitted] ); id.,
at 260, 385 N.W.2d 145 ("We are unpersuaded
that the child abuse reporting statute was intended to relieve parents of their
common law duty to protect their children.
We construe the statute as creating duties for persons who otherwise had
no obligation to protect children because they do not have a recognized special
relationship with the child.").
[2][3] Although our
research has revealed no case by this court in which we expressly have held a
parent criminally liable for failure to act to save his or her child from harm, [FN10] the Appellate Court has recognized that criminal liability
may attach not only to overt acts but also to an omission to act when there is
a legal duty to do so. State
v. Miranda,
supra, 41 Conn.App. at 339, 675 A.2d 925; State
v. Jones,
34 Conn.App. 807, 812-13, 644 A.2d 355, *217
cert. denied, 231
Conn. 909, 648 A.2d 158 (1994) (defendant's
failure to call ambulance or seek help for his obviously injured child indicated "conscious
disregard of a substantial risk of death" within meaning of § 53a-59 [a][3]
). We agree **685 that criminal
conduct can arise not only through overt acts, but also by an omission to act
when there is a legal duty to do so.
"Omissions are as capable of producing consequences as overt acts. Thus, the common law rule that there is no
general duty to protect limits criminal liability where it would otherwise
exist. The special relationship
exception to the 'no duty to act' rule represents a choice to retain liability
for some omissions, which are considered morally unacceptable." State
v. Williquette,
supra, 129 Wis.2d at 253, 385 N.W.2d 145. Therefore, had the defendant been the
victim's parent--someone with an undisputed affirmative legal obligation to
protect and provide for his minor child [FN11]--we would conclude that his failure to protect the child
from abuse could constitute a violation of § 53a-59 (a)(3).
FN10. In State
v. Tomassi,
137 Conn. 113, 119, 75 A.2d 67 (1950), this court
recognized that an act or omission that causes death may constitute murder or
manslaughter.
FN11. The defendant
does not dispute that a parent has a duty to provide for and protect his or her
child, but only whether, under the facts and
circumstances of this case, he should be treated similarly. See part II of this opinion.
II
[4] We next
turn to the issue of whether the duty to protect can be imposed on the
defendant, an adult member of the household unrelated to the child. Both the
state and the defendant recognize that the determination of the existence of a
legal duty is a question of law subject to de novo review by this court. Santopietro
v. New Haven,
239 Conn. 207, 226, 682 A.2d 106 (1996).
[5] The
defendant argues that there is no statutory or common-law precept "authorizing the expansion of assault
under § 53a-59 (a)(3)." The state argues that there is both. We conclude that, based on the trial *218
court's findings that the defendant had established a family-like relationship
with the mother and her two children, that he had voluntarily assumed
responsibility for the care and welfare of both children, and that he had
considered himself the victim's stepfather, there existed a common-law duty to
protect the victim from her mother's abuse, the breach of which can be the
basis of a conviction under § 53a-59 (a)(3). Therefore, we need not decide whether General
Statutes § § 46b-38a, 17-101 and 17a-103 create an express statutory duty as well. [FN12]
FN12. General
Statutes § 46b-38a provides:
"Family violence prevention and response: Definitions. For the
purposes of sections
46b-38a to 46b-38f, inclusive:
"(1) 'Family violence' means an incident resulting in
physical harm, bodily injury or assault, or an act of threatened violence that
constitutes fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault between
family or household members. Verbal
abuse or argument shall not constitute family violence unless there is present
danger and the likelihood that physical violence will occur.
"(2) 'Family or household member' means (A) spouses,
former spouses; (B) parents and their
children; (C) persons eighteen years of
age or older related by blood or marriage;
(D) persons sixteen years of age or older other than those persons in
subparagraph (C) presently residing together or who have resided together; and (E) persons who have a child in common
regardless of whether they are or have been married or have lived together at
any time.
"(3) 'Family violence crime' means a crime as defined
in section 53a-24 which, in addition to its other elements, contains as an
element thereof an act of family violence to a family member and shall not
include acts by parents or guardians disciplining minor children unless such
acts constitute abuse.
"(4) 'Institutions and services' means peace officers,
service providers, mandated reporters of abuse, agencies and departments that
provide services to victims and families and services designed to assist
victims and families."
General
Statutes § 17a-101 provides in pertinent part: "Protection of children from abuse. Mandated reporters. Training program for identification and reporting
of child abuse and neglect. (a) The
public policy of this state is: To
protect children whose health and welfare may be adversely affected through
injury and neglect; to strengthen the
family and to make the home safe for children by enhancing the parental
capacity for good child care; to
provide a temporary or permanent nurturing and safe environment for children
when necessary; and for these purposes
to require the reporting of suspected child abuse, investigation of such
reports by a social agency, and provision of services, where needed, to such
child and family...."
General
Statutes § 17a-103 provides:
"Reports by others. Any
person other than those enumerated in subsection (b) of section
17a-101 having reasonable cause to suspect or
believe that any child under the age of eighteen is in danger of being abused,
or has been abused or neglected, as defined in section 46b-120, may cause a
written or oral report to be made to the
Commissioner of Children and Families or his representative or a law
enforcement agency. The Commissioner
of Children and Families or his representative shall use his best efforts to
obtain the name and address of a person who causes a report to be made pursuant
to this section."
**686 *219
There are many statutes that expressly impose a legal duty to act and attach
liability for the failure to comply with that duty. See, e.g., General
Statutes § § 14-224 and 14-225. With other
statutes, however, the duty to act can be found outside the statutory
definition of the crime itself, either in another statute; see, e.g., General
Statutes § 12- 231 (imposing liability for failure to comply with General
Statutes § 12- 222); or in the common
law. 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott,
supra, § 3.3(a), p. 283.
We note initially that the
question of whether a duty, and thus, liability for the breach of that duty,
should be recognized in this state is not foreclosed by our penal code. Although this notion "does not appear
in haec verba in the penal code, that lacuna is not determinative in this case,
because [General
Statutes] § 53a-4 of the code provides:
'The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed as precluding any
court from recognizing other principles of criminal liability or other defenses
not inconsistent with such provisions.'
The official commentary to that provision states: 'The purpose of this savings clause is to
make clear that the provisions of [General
Statutes § § ] 53a-5 to 53a-23, which define the principles of criminal liability and
defenses, are not necessarily exclusive.
A court is not precluded by sections
53a-5 to 53a-23 from recognizing other such principles and defenses not
inconsistent therewith.' Commission to
Revise the Criminal Statutes, *220 Penal Code Comments, Conn. Gen.Stat.
Ann. (West 1985) § 53a-4, p.
196." State
v. Walton,
227 Conn. 32, 44-45, 630 A.2d 990 (1993).
[6][7] We do not believe
that the principle of imposing a common-law duty in and of itself is
inconsistent with any other principle of criminal liability provided in the
code. "Failure to act when there
is a special relationship does not, by itself, constitute a crime. The failure must expose the dependent
person to some proscribed result. The
definition of proscribed results constitutes the substantive crime, and it is
defined in the criminal code. The rule
regarding omissions, therefore, is not inconsistent with [the penal
code]." State
v. Williquette,
supra, 129 Wis.2d at 254, 385 N.W.2d 145. [FN13] Nor does the plain language of § 53a-59 a)(3) *221
preclude criminal liability from attaching to an omission to act when a legal
duty to act exists and injury results.
See footnote 8 of this opinion.
The issue, therefore, is whether the principle should be recognized as a
matter of policy under the circumstances of this case. We conclude that, under the facts of this
case, it is appropriate to recognize an **687
affirmative duty to act and to impose criminal liability for the failure to act
pursuant to that duty.
FN13. Although there
is no relevant legislative history illuminating whether a person who
voluntarily assumes responsibility for and stands in a particular status
relationship to a child may be prosecuted under § 53a- 59 (a)(3),
"[i]n the absence of guidance from the language of the statute or the
legislative history, we look to common law principles.... It is assumed that all legislation is
interpreted in light of the common law at the time of enactment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunte
v. Blumenthal,
238 Conn. 146, 153, 680 A.2d 1231 (1996). Section 53a-4 expressly authorizes judicial
application of common-law principles of criminal liability that are not
expressly included in the penal code where, as here, such application does not
otherwise conflict with our penal statutes.
See State
v. Walton,
supra, 227 Conn. at 44, 630 A.2d 990.
In his dissent, Justice Berdon accuses us of "
'fashion[ing] additional substantive offenses,' " which the penal code
precludes. Commission to Revise the
Criminal Statutes, Penal Code Comments, Conn. Gen.Stat. Ann. (West 1994) § 53a-4, p. 223. Were we to fashion a truly separate and distinct substantive
offense, such as those recently under consideration by the legislature; see Substitute House Bill No. 6967 (1997),
entitled "An Act Concerning Child
Abuse"; Substitute House Bill No.
5283 (1998), entitled "An Act Concerning Facilitation of Abuse of a
Child"; the dissent's accusations
could be viewed with more legitimacy.
That is not, however, what this case is about. This case presents an issue, albeit of first impression,
whether, under very specific facts, to recognize a common-law duty to protect a
child from abuse, and whether the breach of that duty is conduct that falls
within an existing statute. If the
dissent were correct, even a parent with an undisputed duty to protect a child
from abuse could not be held liable under § 53a-59 (a)(3). Rather than usurping a legislative function,
we merely recognize a long-standing principle of criminal liability that there
are certain crimes that may be committed either by affirmative action or by the
failure to act under circumstances giving rise to a legal duty to act. See 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra,
§ 3.3(e), p. 294.
[8][9] " 'Duty is a
legal conclusion about relationships between individuals, made after the
fact.... The nature of the duty, and
the specific persons to whom it is owed, are determined by the circumstances
surrounding the conduct of the individual.' " Clohessy
v. Bachelor,
237 Conn. 31, 45, 675 A.2d 852 (1996). Although one generally has no legal duty to
aid another in peril, even when the aid can be provided without danger or
inconvenience to the provider, there are
four widely recognized situations in which the failure to act may constitute
breach of a legal duty: (1) where one
stands in a certain relationship to another;
(2) where a statute imposes a duty to help another; (3) where one has
assumed a contractual duty; and (4)
where one voluntarily has assumed the care of another. 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra, § 3.3(a)(1)- (4), pp. 284-87. [FN14] The state argues
that this case falls within both the first and fourth situations, or some
combination thereof.
FN14. A leading case
first outlining these four situations added a requirement to the fourth that
appears to have been omitted in recent years.
See Jones
v. United States,
308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C.App.1962) ( "where
one has voluntarily assumed the care of another and so secluded the helpless
person as to prevent others from rendering aid " [emphasis added]
). This refinement would not seem
applicable to an infant, or for that matter a child of tender years, because a
child is always dependent on others for care and intervention when sick
or in danger.
*222 We begin with
the duty based upon the relationship between the parties. One standing in a certain personal
relationship to another person has some affirmative duties of care with regard
to that person. "Legal rights and
duties ... may arise out of those complex relations of human society which create correlative rights and duties the
performance of which is so necessary to the good order and well-being of
society that the state makes their observance obligatory." Annot., supra, 100
A.L.R.2d at 488.
[10][11] It is undisputed
that parents have a duty to provide food, shelter and medical aid for their
children and to protect them from harm.
See In
re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 9489),
183 Conn. 11, 15, 438 A.2d 801 (1981). "The inherent dependency of a child
upon his parent to obtain medical aid, i.e., the incapacity of a child to
evaluate his conditionand summon aid by himself, supports imposition of such a
duty upon the parent." Commonwealth
v. Konz,
498 Pa. 639, 644, 450 A.2d 638 (1982). Additionally, " '[t]he commonly
understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes: (1) express love and affection for the
child; (2) express personal concern
over the health, education and general well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food,
clothing, and medical care; (4) the
duty to provide an adequate domicile;
and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance.' " In
re Adoption of Webb,
14 Wash.App. 651, 653, 544 P.2d 130 (1975). Indeed, the status relationship giving rise
to a duty to provide and protect that has been before the courts more often
than any other relationship and, at the same time, the one relationship that
courts most frequently assume to exist without expressly so stating, is the
relationship existing between a parent and a minor child.
[12] In addition to biological and adoptive parents and legal
guardians, there may be other adults who establish *223 familial
relationships with and assume responsibility for the care of a child, thereby
creating a legal duty to protect that child from harm. See, e.g., Cornell
v. State,
159 Fla. 687, 32 So.2d 610 (1947) (grandmother
guilty of manslaughter in death of grandchild where she had assumed care of
child but became so intoxicated that she allowed child to smother to
death). "Recognizing the primary
responsibility of a natural parent does not mean that an unrelated person may
not also have some responsibilities incident to the care and custody of a
child. Such duties may be regarded as
derived from the primary custodian, i.e., the natural parent, or arise from the
nature of the circumstances." People
v. Berg,
171 Ill.App.3d 316, 320, 121 Ill.Dec. 515, 525 N.E.2d 573 (1988); see 1 W. LaFave
& A. Scott, supra, § 3.3(a), p. 286
("if two people, though not closely related, live together under one roof,
one may have a duty **688 to act to aid the other who becomes
helpless").
Most courts deciding
whether, under a particular set of facts, liability for an omission to act may
be imposed under a statute that does not itself impose a duty to act, have
looked to whether a duty to act exists in another statute, in the common law or
in a contract. 1 W. LaFave & A.
Scott, supra, § 3.3(a), p. 283. Of those courts acting outside the context
of a statutory or contractual duty that have held a defendant criminally liable
for failing to protect a child from injury,
most have relied on a combination of both the first and fourth situations
described by Professors LaFave and Scott to establish a duty as the predicate
for the defendant's conviction. More
specifically, these courts have examined the nature of the relationship of the
defendant to the victim and whether the defendant, as part of that relationship,
had assumed a responsibility for the victim. [FN15] We find the reliance by these courts on this
combination of factors persuasive.
FN15. As we have
stated, some courts in other jurisdictions have held that liability can flow
from the breach of a duty created by contract; see, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Pestinikas,
421 Pa.Super. 371, 617 A.2d 1339 (1992) (because
there was evidence that victim's death had been caused by appellant's failure
to provide food and medical care that he had agreed by oral contract to
provide, omission to act was sufficient to support conviction for criminal
homicide); Davis
v. Commonwealth,
230 Va. 201, 335 S.E.2d 375 (1985) (defendant
guilty of involuntary manslaughter in death by starvation and exposure of his
elderly mother, where defendant breached implied contract to care for mother,
in return for which he was allowed to live in mother's home and share her
social security benefits). The state is not relying on that theory as a basis
for conviction and, therefore, we express no opinion as to whether that
relationship can serve as a theory of
liability.
*224 In People
v. Salley,
153 App. Div.2d 704, 544 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1989), the
court examined the issue of whether the defendant, a woman who was living with
a man named Taylor and Kenneth, a three year old who was the son of Taylor's
estranged wife and another man, as well as five other children, was guilty of
manslaughter in the second degree for failing to secure medical attention for
Kenneth, who was being physically abused by Taylor. Taylor had inflicted approximately seventy bruises on Kenneth
and Kenneth died from a combination of a fracture, internal bleeding and
various wounds to his body. Because the defendant "had assumed the
parental obligations of care for Kenneth," and had been aware of and
consciously disregarded the substantial and unjustifiable risk of his death in
failing to get Kenneth help during the time he was being abused by Taylor, the
court concluded that she properly could be convicted of manslaughter. Id.,
at 705, 544 N.Y.S.2d 680.
In State
v. Orosco,
113 N.M. 789, 833 P.2d 1155 (1991), the court
examined whether the defendant, who lived with the victim and his mother and
who failed to intervene when one of his friends sexually abused the victim,
could be held criminally liable for the abuse. Relying on State
v. Walden,
supra, 306 N.C. 466, 293 S.E.2d 780, the court
held that, by assuming the care and welfare of the child, the defendant stood
in the position of a parent. [FN16] State
v. Orosco,
supra, at 796, 833 P.2d 1155.
FN16. As an
additional basis for its decision, the court reasoned that the defendant's
failure to protect the child could be regarded by the attacker as support of
the abusive conduct and, therefore, made him an aider and abettor.
*225 In Leet
v. State,
595 So.2d 959 (Fla.App.1991), the court examined
whether the defendant could be held criminally responsible for abuse of a child
by his mother although he was not the child's father. The statute at issue required the state to prove "[w]hoever
... by culpable negligence, deprives a child of, or allows a child to be
deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or who,
knowingly or by culpable negligence, inflicts or permits the infliction of
physical or mental injury to the child...." Id.,
at 961.
Despite the broad language of the statute imposing liability on
"whoever," the court discussed at length the nature of the
defendant's relationship with the child victim, and his assumption of responsibility
for the child's care and held that, because the defendant had "assumed
responsibility for [the child's] well-being when he established a family-like
relationship with [the child] and his mother," he could be held
responsible for **689 permitting the child's abuse by his mother. Id., at 962-63.
Although the defendant had argued that he was not financially
responsible for the child and could not have authorized his medical treatment,
the court, nevertheless, concluded that he had the authority, and indeed, the
duty to prevent the mother's conduct. Id.
In People
v. Wong,
182 App. Div.2d 98, 588 N.Y.S.2d 119, rev'd on
other grounds, 81
N.Y.2d 600, 619 N.E.2d 377, 601 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1993),
the court examined whether the defendants, who had been babysitters for the
child victim's parents, could be convicted of manslaughter for harming the
child and for failing to provide him with necessary medical care. To support a conviction based upon their
failure to provide medical attention, the prosecution relied on two
theories: (1) that the defendants had
contracted with the child's parents to care for the child while the parents
worked; and (2) *226 that the
defendants voluntarily had assumed care for the child. Id.,
at 108, 588 N.Y.S.2d 119. The court embraced both theories,
recognizing that the voluntary assumption of care, as well as a contractual
babysitting agreement, were sufficient to trigger a legal duty. Id. The court
concluded that by assuming care for the child, the defendants created a legal
duty "substantially coextensive with those which would be borne by a
parent...." (Citations
omitted.) Id. Although the New
York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of the defendants due to
insufficient evidence, it nevertheless endorsed the state's theory of prosecution
as "legally sound." People
v. Wong,
supra, 81 N.Y.2d at 607, 619 N.E.2d 377, 601 N.Y.S.2d 440.
[13] As
these cases demonstrate, the traditional approach in this country is to
restrict the duty to save others from harm to certain very narrow categories of
cases. We are not prepared now to
adopt a broad general rule covering other circumstances. [FN17] We conclude only
that, in accordance with the trial court findings, when the defendant, who
considered himself the victim's parent, established a familial relationship
with the victim's mother and her children and assumed the role of a father, he
assumed, under the common law, the same legal duty to protect the victim from
the abuse as if he were, in fact, the victim's guardian. Under these circumstances, to require the
defendant as a matter of law to take affirmative action to prevent harm to the
victim or be criminally responsible imposes a reasonable duty. [FN18] That duty does not
depend on an ability to *227 regulate the mother's discipline of the
victim or on the defendant having exclusive control of the victim when the
injuries occurred. Nor is the duty
contingent upon an ability by the state or the mother to look to the defendant
for child support. [FN19] Moreover,
whether the defendant had created a total in loco parentis relationship with
the victim by January, 1993, is not dispositive of whether the defendant had
assumed a responsibility for the victim.
Leet
v. State,
supra, 595 So.2d at 962. "If immediate or emergency medical
attention is required from a child's
custodian it should not matter that such custodian is not the primary care provider
or for that matter a legally designated surrogate." People
v. Berg,
supra, 171 Ill.App.3d at 320, 121 Ill.Dec. 515, 525 N.E.2d 573 (wherein court concluded that although defendant had duty
as "any person" under child endangerment statute based upon evidence
that he lived with victim and her mother, would play with victim, feed and
clothe her, discipline her and take her places, under circumstances of case **690
there was insufficient evidence that defendant had endangered victim's health
by not obtaining medical treatment).
FN17. Many other
countries have adopted a more inclusive view in determining what classes of
persons shall have a duty to rescue another from harm when they can do so
without unreasonable risk to themselves.
See J. Dawson, "Negotiorum Gestio:
The Altruistic Intermeddler," 74 Harv. L.Rev. 1073, 1101-1106
(1961); see also L. Frankel,
"Criminal Omissions: A Legal Microcosm," 11 Wayne L.Rev. 367, 368-69
(1965).
FN18. Because, as
the trial court found, the defendant "failed to act to help or aid [the
child] by promptly notifying authorities of her injuries, taking her for
medical care, removing her from her circumstances and guarding her from future
abuses," we need not decide whether one or more
of these measures would have been sufficient to shield the defendant from
liability under § 53a-59 (a)(3).
FN19. Certainly, if
the defendant had been the biological father of only one of the two children,
it would be absurd to suggest that he would have had an obligation to stop the
mother from abusing one of the children but not the other.
Nor should we reject the
concept of a duty in this case because the defendant might not have been able
to authorize medical treatment for the victim had he taken her to the
hospital. The status required to
impose the legal duty to safeguard the victim is not coextensive with the
status that permits one to authorize treatment. Quite obviously, had the defendant brought the victim to the
hospital at any time throughout the four month period during which she was
abused by her mother, a physician would have had the ability to examine and
treat her, and the costs would be paid by her parent, *228 guardian or
the state, if necessary. "Any
physician examining a child with respect to whom abuse is suspected shall ...
have the right to keep such child in the custody of a hospital ... and ...
perform diagnostic tests and procedures necessary to the detection of child
abuse with or without the consent of his parents, guardian or other person
having responsibility for his care.... The expenses for such temporary care and
such diagnostic tests and procedures shall be paid by the parents or guardian
of such child or, if they are unable to pay, by the commissioner of children
and families." General Statutes
(Rev. to 1995) § 17a-101 (d). [FN20]
FN20. This provision
was deleted in 1996 and was replaced by General
Statutes § 17a-101f. Public Acts
1996, No. 96-246, § § 1, 8. The current provision permits the
commissioner of children and families to recover the cost of treatment "from
the parent if the parent has been found by a court to have abused or neglected
such child." General
Statutes § 17a-101f.
Finally, we recognize the
continuing demographic trend reflecting a significant increase in
nontraditional alternative family arrangements. United States Bureau of the Census, Marital Status and Living
Arrangements: March 1984, Current
Population Reports, Series p-20, No. 399 (1985). Consequently, more and more
children will be living with or may depend upon adults who do not qualify as a
natural or adoptive parent. The
attachment by children to the adults who care for them does not, however,
depend exclusively upon whether the caregiver is the natural or adoptive parent
or another person who has assumed the caretaker role. Children become attached to people who care for them, and this attachment is
"rooted inevitably in the infant's inability to ensure his own
survival...." J. Goldstein, A.
Freud & A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interest of the Child (1973) p. 18. To distinguish among children in deciding
which ones are entitled to protection based upon whether their adult caregivers
have chosen to *229 have their relationships officially recognized
hardly advances the public policy of protecting children from abuse.
[14][15][16][17][18] The defendant
acknowledges that he could not simply close his eyes to evidence of the
brutality the child suffered and that his failure to protect her was punishable
under § 53-21. [FN21] Moreover, he contends that "the risk of injury
statute implements the state's public policy of protecting the health and welfare
of children and imposes a specific criminal penalty for failure to provide such
protection," by punishing any person who causes or permits a child
to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of that child is
endangered. Nevertheless, the
defendant argues that although he had a duty under § 53-21, he did
not have a duty under § 53a-59 (a)(3). [FN22] The logic of his
argument **691 is flawed.
Indeed, it is well established that this court will look to other
relevant statutes governing the same or similar subject matter because the
legislature is presumed to have created a consistent body of law. Daly
v. DelPonte,
225 Conn. 499, 510, 624 A.2d 876 (1993). Therefore, as to the issue *230 of duty, because § 53-21, without
any explicit restriction, holds responsible any person who permits abuse
of a child to occur, to prescribe a duty in connection with § 53a-59 (a)(3)
to prevent such abuse furthers "a harmonious and consistent body of
law" as opposed to antagonizing legislative intent. [FN23] We conclude that
the defendant had a duty, under the facts and circumstances of this case, to
protect the victim and prevent further harm to her, and that for violating that
duty to her, he can be found guilty of having violated § 53a-59 (a)(3). [FN24]
FN21. Additionally,
the defendant points to the risk of injury statute to argue that the
legislature already criminalizes his conduct and that, therefore, § 53a-59 (a)(3)
should not be read to apply to that same conduct. This court has rejected the notion that merely because one
criminal statute covers certain conduct it is therefore exclusive. State
v. Perruccio,
192 Conn. 154, 162, 471 A.2d 632, appeal
dismissed, 469
U.S. 801, 105 S.Ct. 55, 83 L.Ed.2d 6 (1984). Furthermore, we have held that "where
the elements of two or more distinct offenses are combined in the same act,
prosecution for one will not bar prosecution for the other." State
v. Chetcuti,
173 Conn. 165, 169, 377 A.2d 263 (1977).
FN22. The defendant
attempts to distinguish some of the cases cited by
the state and referenced in this opinion because they involve child
endangerment statutes that resemble § 53-21. See, e.g., Leet
v. State,
supra, 595 So.2d 959; People
v. Berg,
supra, 171 Ill.App.3d 316, 121 Ill.Dec. 515, 525 N.E.2d 573. This argument is
misplaced. Although the courts in
those cases were deciding whether the defendant could be criminally liable for
child endangerment, and although the statutes held responsible
"whoever" had failed to act, the courts, nevertheless, first examined
whether the defendant had a duty vis-a-vis the child. Therefore, their discussion of when a duty should be imposed is
pertinent.
FN23. Although today
we decline the state's invitation to decide whether the defendant had an
express statutory duty pursuant to §
§ 17a- 101,
17a-103 and 46b-38a to protect the victim in this case, we nevertheless
appreciate the important public policy of protecting children from abuse and
neglect as set forth in those statutes.
The legislature has specifically recognized that "family violence
crimes" are not confined to family members but may also involve unrelated
household members; General
Statutes § 46b-38a; and expressly
stated that the public policy of the state is to "protect children whose
health and welfare may be adversely affected through injury and neglect ... and
to make the home safe for children...."
General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 17a-101. Moreover, there
is an express duty on all persons "having reasonable cause to suspect or
believe that any child under the age of eighteen is in danger of being abused or
neglected ... [to] immediately cause a written or oral report to be made to the
state commissioner of children and families.... Any such person who in good faith makes the report ... shall be
immune from any liability, civil or criminal...." General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 17a-103. Imposing a common-law legal duty on the
defendant in this case is consistent with the legislature's creation of a
legally cognizable relationship, advances its express public policy to protect
children and fosters the notion that ultimate responsibility for a child's
safety transcends biology.
FN24. In his
dissent, Justice Berdon relies heavily upon the introduction of the facilitator
abuse statute; Substitute House Bill
No. 5283, § 1(a) (1998) (H.B. No.
5283); and on the legislature's failure
ultimately to enact that statute to support the proposition that the assault
statute, § 53a-59 (a)(3),
does not punish the defendant's behavior.
The dissent maintains that H.B. No. 5283 would not have been introduced
if the legislature thought that § 53a-59 (a)(3)
could be used to punish behavior similar to that prohibited by H.B. No.
5283. The dissent also claims that the
bill was not acted upon by the judiciary committee,
at least in part, because the behavior punishable by the facilitator abuse
statute was already prohibited by § 53-21, the
risk of injury statute. In addition to
the fact that these theories are diametrically opposed, this reliance on
legislative silence is misplaced.
It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that we rely
on the intent of the legislature as that intent has been expressed. Connecticut
Light & Power Co. v. Walsh,
134 Conn. 295, 301, 57 A.2d 128 (1948) ("we
are confined to the intention which is expressed in the words [the legislature]
has used"); see Madison
Education Assn. v. Madison,
174 Conn. 189, 192, 384 A.2d 361 (1978). There has been no affirmative expression of
legislative intent linking the failure to enact the facilitator abuse statute
to § 53a-59 (a)(3). As the dissent acknowledges, the judiciary
committee took no action on H.B. No. 5283 and the dissent points to no
affirmative statement indicating the reason for this inaction.
"Ordinarily, we are reluctant to draw inferences regarding legislative
intent from the failure of a legislative committee to report a bill to the
floor, because in most cases the reasons for that lack of action remain
unexpressed and thus obscured in the mist of committee inactivity." In
re Valerie D.,
223 Conn. 492, 518 n. 19, 613 A.2d 748 (1992).
Although we have relied on the failure to amend a
statute as an indication of legislative intent regarding that statute or
statutes within the same legislative
scheme; see, e.g., Anderson
v. Ludgin,
175 Conn. 545, 555, 400 A.2d 712 (1978); cf. State
v. McVeigh,
224 Conn. 593, 619-21, 620 A.2d 133 (1993)
(subsequent amendments held not relevant to legislative intent at time of
enactment of underlying statute); we
hesitate unilaterally to assign motives to the legislature where it has failed
to enact a statute other than the one whose interpretation is before
us. Cf. In
re Valerie D.,
supra, 223 Conn. at 517-18, 613 A.2d 748 (noting
significance of legislature's failure to pass one of two alternative provisions
covering the same subject matter upon which simultaneous hearings were
held). As a corollary to that
principle, we likewise hesitate to derive legislative intent from the mere
introduction of a bill and from committee hearings on that bill. Committee hearings provide a useful
laboratory in which to explore new legislative approaches. To rely on dialogue between interested
members of the public would place a high cost on the dynamic nature of the
legislative process and unnecessarily chill the introduction of bills and
discourse attendant thereto. Finally,
the fact that the state and the dissent have suggested opposing theories to
explain the legislature's failure to enact H.B. No. 5283 best illustrates that
one guess is as good as the other, and is the epitome of why we cannot engage
in this kind of speculation.
**692 *231 The judgment of the Appellate Court is
reversed and the case is remanded to that court for consideration of the
defendant's remaining claims. [FN25]
FN25. The defendant
has argued that he did not actually know that the child had been abused by her
mother and that knowledge of her injuries should not be equated with knowledge
of their cause. He also argues that
there was no evidence that he had the ability to prevent any harm from
occurring to the child. Those claims
of insufficiency of evidence are to be considered on the merits by the
Appellate Court on remand. See
footnote 7 of this opinion. We note
that the attorney who represented the defendant before the Appellate Court was
placed on inactive status in June, 1997.
As a result, following the granting of certification by this court, in
order to ensure that the defendant be properly represented, the trial court
ordered the appellate unit of the office of the chief public defender to assign
the case to new appellate counsel in order to represent the defendant in the
certified appeal. Attorney Susan M.
Cormier entered an appearance on behalf of the defendant and currently
represents him in this appeal. Under
the unique circumstances of this case, in the exercise of our supervisory
authority, we order that the Appellate Court consider, on the merits, any
constitutional claims of due process and double jeopardy arising as a result of this decision that
appellate counsel seeks to raise.
Finally, in light of the problems experienced by the defendant's initial
appellate counsel, we also order that current appellate counsel be permitted to
rebrief the issue of sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to the risk of
injury charge. See footnote 5 of this
opinion.
In this opinion CALLAHAN,
C.J., and BORDEN and NORCOTT, JJ., concurred.
*232 PALMER, Associate Justice, with whom McDONALD, Associated
Justice, joins, concurring.
I join the opinion of the
majority. A serious question remains,
however, as to whether the defendant, Santos Miranda, had fair warning that his
failure to act, in the particular circumstances of this case, could give rise
to the crime of assault in the first degree in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-59 (a)(3). The legal duty
that we recognize today has never before been expressly recognized in this
state; indeed, the Appellate Court,
upon consideration of the defendant's appeal, unanimously concluded that no
such duty existed. State
v. Miranda,
41 Conn.App. 333, 340-41, 675 A.2d 925 (1996). In such circumstances, it is by no means
clear that the due process clauses of the
federal and state constitutions permit such a duty to be imposed on this
defendant for purposes of criminal liability under the assault statute. [FN1] See, e.g., United
States v. Lanier,
520 U.S. 259, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 1225, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) ("[T]he canon of strict construction of criminal
statutes ... ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal
statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly *233 covered....
[A]lthough clarity at the requisite level may be supplied by judicial gloss on
an otherwise uncertain statute ... due process bars courts from applying a
novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute
nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its
scope...." [Citations omitted.]
); Bouie
v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 347, 354-55, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964) ("[w]hen a[n] ... unforeseeable state-court
construction of a criminal statute is applied retroactively to subject a person
to criminal liability for past conduct, the effect is to deprive him of due
process of law in the sense of fair warning that his contemplated conduct
constitutes a crime"); State
v. Webb,
238 Conn. 389, 531, 680 A.2d 147 (1996)
(vagueness doctrine "requires statutes to provide fair notice of the
conduct to which they pertain ... so that an individual may steer between
lawful and unlawful conduct" [citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted] ). Since the defendant will
have the opportunity to raise a due process
claim on remand, however; [FN2] see footnote 25 of
the **693 majority opinion; and
because I agree with the analysis and conclusions of the majority, I join the
opinion of the majority.
FN1. There is, of
course, a difference between the recognition of an existing duty, on the one
hand, and the creation of an altogether new duty, on the other. Whether that distinction is significant for
due process purposes under the specific facts of this case remains to be seen.
FN2. The importance
of this issue to the defendant cannot be overstated in view of the fact that he
received a cumulative sentence of thirty years imprisonment on the six counts
of assault in the first degree.
Because the defendant also received a consecutive ten year prison term
on the one count of risk of injury to a child, his total effective sentence is
forty years imprisonment. By contrast,
the child's mother, who, it appears, actually caused the child's injuries,
received a total effective sentence of only seven years imprisonment. See footnote 4 of the majority opinion.
McDONALD, Associate Justice, concurring and dissenting in part.
I concur with the result
reached by the majority. I do so
because the Appellate Court, in reversing the assault convictions, simply held
that the defendant, Santos Miranda, was not the biological or legal parent of
the victim and, therefore, owed no legal duty to protect *234 her. State
v. Miranda,
41 Conn.App. 333, 340-41, 675 A.2d 925 (1996). The Appellate Court should have considered
the circumstances of the case [FN1] in deciding the issue of legal duty. See Clohessy
v. Bachelor,
237 Conn. 31, 45, 675 A.2d 852 (1996).
FN1. There is,
however, considerable confusion as to the factual circumstances. The premise of the Appellate Court's
decision and of the certified issue was that the victim was being abused by her
mother. This is, however, not borne
out in the trial court's findings. The
defendant was acquitted of nineteen counts of assault in the first degree
charging him with having failed to prevent the mother from abusing the victim,
or having himself injured the victim.
The defendant was convicted of six counts of assault in the first
degree, including two counts of unspecified reckless conduct, two counts of
reckless conduct by allowing the victim to live in a situation of risk of
repeated assault, and two counts of reckless conduct
by failing to take measures to prevent the victim from living in such a
situation.
If the adult defendant was
having a continuous intimate relationship with the victim's mother who was
raising the newborn child in their household, then the defendant would have a
duty to prevent, if he could, the ongoing abuse in the household of the
helpless victim of which he was aware.
See 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (1986) § 3.3(a), p. 286. Although the defendant was not related to anyone in the
household by marriage, biology or adoption, his cohabitation with the victim's
mother created a relationship with that responsibility. Many children currently live in households
founded by unmarried couples. Excusing
those who do not marry from such responsibility discriminates against marriage,
upon which "society may be said to be built"; Reynolds
v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 165, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1879); and "without which there would be
neither civilization nor progress";
Maynard
v. Hill,
125 U.S. 190, 211, 8 S.Ct. 723, 31 L.Ed. 654 (1888); and does so to the peril of our children.
I do not agree, however,
that the first degree assault statute should be applied to this case without
more clarification. The existence of a
duty to protect against *235 serious physical injury in the household
and the application of that duty under the
assault statute depends upon the circumstances of the case, the relationship of
the parties, the harm the statute protects against and the conduct prohibited
by the penal statute. It is one thing
to recognize that a stepparent is duty-bound to stop the abuse of a helpless
child in his or her home and extend that role to the live-in boyfriend or
girlfriend. It is quite another to
decide that a caregiver with a family-like relationship may be convicted of
first degree assault because that caregiver fails to seek medical aid or report
suspected child abuse to the authorities.
Whether one who does not
personally inflict the physical injury may be held liable under the assault
statute for failure to seek medical treatment and whether a worsening of the
victim's condition because of that failure is required, whether a failure to
report continuing abuse may support liability for assault, and whether this
doctrine should be restricted to cases of child abuse are questions I believe
we must address. [FN2]
FN2. In People
v. Miranda,
204 App. Div.2d 575, 612 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1994), the
Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, reinstated those counts of an
indictment charging the defendant mother with assault in the first degree for
"failure to obtain medical care for [her infant child] or other nonfeasance contributing to the
assaults...." Id. The Appellate Division cited People
v. Wong,
81 N.Y.2d 600, 619 N.E.2d 377, 601 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1993), in which it was alleged, in connection with a child's
death, that the defendants' failure to seek medical care after the child's
injury was inflicted resulted in the child's death. See id.,
at 607, 619 N.E.2d 377, 601 N.Y.S.2d 440. The court's theory of criminal liability in
Wong was that a "passive" defendant could be found
guilty of an offense under § 15.10 of the New York Penal Law. Id. "Under ... § 15.10, an
individual's criminal liability may be predicated on an 'omission.' " Id. New York's penal
law defines "omission" as "a failure to perform an act as to
which a duty of performance is imposed by law." N.Y.
Penal Law § 15.00[3] (McKinney 1998); see also People
v. Steinberg,
79 N.Y.2d 673, 680, 595 N.E.2d 845, 584 N.Y.S.2d 770 (1992). Our penal code, however, contains no like provisions
respecting omissions except as to criminal attempt under General
Statutes § 53a-49.
**694 As Justice
Palmer and Justice Berdon point out, liability for assault, absent accessorial
liability, where the *236 trauma causing the physical injury is
inflicted by an unknown party, is, to say the least, a "novel
construction" of the assault statute.
Cf. Bouie
v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S.
347, 353-55, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964). I therefore join Justice Palmer's
concurrence with respect to the due process concerns regarding notice, also
alluded to in part V of Justice Berdon's dissent.
I should also add that I
have doubts concerning the validity of the multiple punishments imposed on the
assault counts. Some of those
punishments were for multiple counts based on the same injury and for multiple
violations of one statute based on the same conduct.
In footnote 25 of the
majority opinion, the court's order of remand allows the defendant to broaden
his claims on appeal. I concur in that
order of remand and would expand it to include the issues raised in this
concurring opinion.
BERDON, Associate Justice, dissenting.
Cases, such as the one
before us, that present revolting facts concerning the physical abuse of a four
month old child, test the foundation of our democracy. The rule of law must be upheld even when
confronted with alarming allegations of improper acts, indeed allegations of
loathsome conduct on the part of the defendant. The question for this court, in cases such as this, is whether
the legislature intended to make the conduct with which the defendant was
charged criminal under General
Statutes § 53a-59 (a)(3), assault in the first
degree. It is not whether this court,
were it sitting as a legislature, would have proscribed the conduct at
issue. "Such action by a
legislature may well be commendable, but by a court condemnable." State
v. Williquette,
129 Wis.2d 239, 263, 385 N.W.2d 145 (1986)
(Heffernan, C. J., dissenting). Simply
put, we cannot craft a substantive offense ex post facto in order to include
conduct that we find *237 abhorrent to our sensitivities and that of the
general public. It is this judicial
restraint that sharply puts into focus one of the essential differences between
democratic and totalitarian forms of government.
The facts of this case, as
they pertain to the issues before us, are as follows: The trial court concluded that the defendant, Santos Miranda, was
guilty of six counts of assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a- 59 (a)(3),
not because he physically abused the child, nor because he aided in the abuse
of the child, but, rather, as a result of the following: (1) that he lived with the physically abused
child and the child's mother in the same household as a "live-in boyfriend"; (2) that he established a
"family-like" relationship with the child--he considered himself her
stepfather and he took care of her like a father; and (3) that he was aware of the child's injuries but failed to
notify the authorities, failed to obtain medical treatment for her, failed to
remove her from the circumstances and failed to guard her from future abuse. [FN1] The Appellate
Court reversed the defendant's assault convictions, holding that the
"failure to act when one is under no legal duty to do so, thereby
permitting a dangerous condition to exist, is not sufficient to support a
conviction for assault in the first degree pursuant to § 53a- 59 (a)(3)." **695State
v. Miranda,
41 Conn.App. 333, 338-39, 675 A.2d 925
(1996).
I agree with the Appellate Court.
FN1. "The
defendant was charged with twenty-five counts of assault in the first
degree. He was found not guilty of the
remaining nineteen counts, all of which charged him with having either
personally inflicted the victim's injuries, or having aided and abetted another
in inflicting those injuries." State
v. Miranda,
41 Conn.App. 333, 334 n. 1, 675 A.2d 925 (1996).
I
The majority's
determination that the facts in this case were sufficient to create a legal
duty on the part of the defendant to protect the child from parental *238
abuse pursuant to § 53a-59 (a)(3)
is premised on its unsupported conclusion that had the defendant been the
victim's parent, he would have had an undisputed affirmative legal obligation
to protect the child from assault pursuant
to § 53a-59 (a)(3). There is an affirmative obligation on the
defendant and the parent, under the circumstances of this case, to protect the
child, but that duty does not arise under § 53a-59 (a)(3). Rather, in this state, the obligation to
act arises under General
Statutes § 53-21, entitled "[i]njury or risk of injury to, or
impairing the morals of, children," [FN2] which was enacted by the legislature many years ago to
address the failure to act with respect to the welfare of a child. This court made it clear, in State
v. Perruccio,
192 Conn. 154, 159, 471 A.2d 632, appeal
dismissed, 469
U.S. 801, 105 S.Ct. 55, 83 L.Ed.2d 6 (1984), that
the proscription of § 53-21 included
"deliberate indifference to, acquiescence in, or the creation of
situations inimical to the minor's moral or physical welfare...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Here, the trial court found the defendant
guilty of risk of injury with respect to the child, for which he was sentenced
to the maximum term of ten years.
FN2. See footnote 3
of the majority opinion for the text of § 53- 21.
The defendant's conviction
under § 53-21,
however, is not before us. [FN3] What is before
this court on appeal from the Appellate Court is the following certified issue: "Under the circumstances of this case,
did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the defendant could not be
convicted of violating *239General
Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (3) because he had no legal duty to protect the victim from
parental abuse?" State
v. Miranda,
237 Conn. 932, 677 A.2d 1372 (1996).
FN3. The Appellate
Court refused to review the claim that there was insufficient evidence to
support a conviction under § 53-21 because
it was "inadequately briefed."
State
v. Miranda,
supra, 41 Conn.App. at 338, 675 A.2d 925. This court refused to grant certification
to appeal that issue. See State
v. Miranda,
237 Conn. 932, 677 A.2d 1372 (1996). I agree with the majority that, in the
interests of justice, on remand all the claims of insufficiency of evidence and
any constitutional claims, including due process and double jeopardy, may be
raised by the defendant's appellate counsel.
II
The majority addresses an
issue that is necessarily implied in the certified question--that is, whether
the "conduct" referred to in § 53a-59 (a)(3)
includes the failure to act. I
disagree with the majority's very tenuous argument
that it does. Section
53a-59 (a) provides in part that "[a] person
is guilty of assault in the first degree when ... (3) under circumstances
evincing an extreme indifference to human life he recklessly engages in conduct
which creates a risk of death to another person, and thereby causes serious
physical injury to another person...."
Although "conduct" can include the failure to act under
circumstances when there is a duty to act;
1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (1986) § 3.3., p. 282; the majority points to nothing in the text of § 53a-59 (a)(3),
or its legislative history, to support its conclusion that conduct under § 53a-59 (a)(3)
includes the failure to act. In fact,
both the common definition of assault--"a violent attack with physical
means"; Webster's Third New
International Dictionary; and the legal definition of assault--"[a]ny
wilful attempt or threat to inflict injury upon the person of
another"; Black's Law Dictionary
(6th Ed.1990); belie the majority's claim.
Moreover, by construing § 53a-59 (a)(3)
to include the duty to act, the majority stands a long-standing and fundamental
principle of statutory construction on its head: Penal statutes "are to be expounded strictly against an
offender, and liberally in his favor.
This can only be accomplished, by giving to them a literal construction,
so far as they operate penally...." Daggett
v. State,
4 Conn. 60, 63 (1821). Indeed, what this court stated in
**696State
v. Cataudella,
159 Conn. 544, 271 A.2d 99 (1970), *240 is applicable to this case. "A statute imposing a penalty should
receive a strict construction in favor of those who might be subject to its
provisions. [N]o act should be held to
be in violation ... which does not fall within its spirit and the fair import
of its language. Morin v. Newbury,
79 Conn. 338, 340, 65 A. 156 [1906]; State
v. Faro,
118 Conn. 267, 273, 171 A. 660 [1934]; State
v. Parker,
112 Conn. 39, 46, 151 A. 325 [1930]; Hartford-Connecticut
Trust Co. v. O'Connor,
137 Conn. 267, 274, 76 A.2d 9 [1950]. While a criminal statute is not to be
defeated by an unreasonably strict construction of its language, it must be
rather strictly construed so that the conduct made criminal will be
ascertainable with reasonable certainty from a careful reading of the
statute. A corollary to this is the
rule that the meaning of a penal statute cannot be extended by presumption or
intendment. State
v. Zazzaro,
128 Conn. 160, 167, 20 A.2d 737 [1941]. State
v. Benson,
153 Conn. 209, 215-16, 214 A.2d 903 [1965]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Cataudella,
supra, at 555-56, 271 A.2d 99; State
v. Smith,
194 Conn. 213, 221-22 n. 7, 479 A.2d 814 (1984) (
"[c]riminal convictions will be upheld only when the defendant's behavior
is clearly forbidden by the statute under which he or she has been
prosecuted"). A careful reading of § 53a-59 (a)(3)
would never lead a rational reader to believe
that a person was subject to criminal liability under the statute for the
failure to act--whether the person is a stranger, a live-in boyfriend, or a
parent.
Furthermore, the majority
mistakenly relies on the Appellate Court's decision in this case and in State
v. Jones,
34 Conn.App. 807, 812-13, 644 A.2d 355, cert.
denied, 231
Conn. 909, 648 A.2d 158 (1994), to support its
claim that the failure to act is included in "conduct" under § 53a-59 (a)(3). The Appellate Court in this case did not
hold that "conduct" in § 53a-59 (a)(3)
included *241 the omission to act;
rather, it merely stated that "conduct, creating criminal
liability, may be by an act or an omission to act if within the intendment
of the statute." (Emphasis
added.) State
v. Miranda,
supra, 41 Conn.App. at 339, 675 A.2d 925. The Appellate Court in this case concluded,
as I do, that § 53a-59 (a)(3)
does not include the "omission to act." In State
v. Jones,
supra, at 812, 644 A.2d 355, the Appellate Court
did not specifically determine that the defendant's failure to act--that is,
the failure to call an ambulance when the defendant knew his child was
injured--constituted criminal "conduct." Rather, the Appellate Court in Jones affirmed the trial court's finding that the defendant's
act of violently shaking and subjecting the child to a sudden impact was
conduct that justified his conviction under § 53a-59 (a)(3). [FN4] Id.
FN4. See footnote 11
of this dissent.
III
Nevertheless, even if the
majority were correct that one person can assault another person under § 53a-59 (a)(3)
by failing to act, the defendant's conviction in this case cannot stand. By superimposing on § 53a-59 (a)(3)
a common-law duty on the part of a person to act in order to protect a child
from harm when that third person voluntarily assumes responsibility for the
care and the welfare of the child and considers himself to have a stepfather-
stepchild relationship with the child, the majority has created a new crime.
See Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1990) ("[a] crime may be defined to be
an act done in violation of those duties which an individual owes to the
community, and for the breach of which the law has provided that the offender
shall make satisfaction to the public");
see also 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra, § 1.2, pp. 8-16. In
crafting this new crime, the majority ignores the fact that it is the
legislature that defines substantive crimes.
This division between the legislature and the court was *242
established in 1971 when the legislature adopted the penal code and repealed
General Statutes (Rev. to 1968) §
54-117, [FN5] which
recognized common-law **697 crimes. [FN6] See Public Acts
1969, No. 828, § § 1 et seq. and 214.
FN5. General Statutes
(Rev. to 1968) § 54-117 provides: "In case of conviction for any high
crime or misdemeanor at common law, or of assault with intent to kill, the
offender may be imprisoned not more than fifteen years or be fined not more
than five hundred dollars or both, and, in case of conviction for any other
offense at common law, the offender may be imprisoned not more than one year or
be fined not more than three hundred dollars or both."
FN6. The majority
claims in footnote 13 of its opinion that it is not creating a substantive
offense, but merely interpreting § 53a-59 (a)(3). Incredibly, in the same footnote, the
majority concedes that it is recognizing "a common-law duty to protect a
child from abuse...." Indeed, Justice Palmer, in his concurring opinion,
concedes that "the legal duty that [the majority recognizes] today has
never before been expressly recognized in this state...." By imposing this common-law duty, the
majority crafts a new crime.
The majority posits that "[i]f the dissent were
correct, even a parent with an undisputed duty to protect a child from abuse
could not be held liable under § 53a-59 (a)(3)." That is absolutely correct--even a parent
could not be held liable under § 53a-59 (a)(3)
for failing to protect his or her own child.
See part IV of this dissent (legislative history fails to support claim
that failure to act on part of parent is conduct proscribed under § 53a-59 [a][3]
); J. Bruckmann, G. Nash & J. Katz,
Connecticut Criminal Caselaw Handbook:
A Practitioner's Guide (1989) p. 494 (accused may be charged only with
those crimes that are cognizable under statutory law); see State
v. Beccia,
199 Conn. 1, 5, 505 A.2d 683 (1986) (same). The parent, as well as the defendant in
this case, however, could be found criminally liable under § 53-21 of
causing injury or risk of injury to, or impairing the morals of children, and
the defendant was in fact convicted of that crime. See part I of this dissent.
Even if the majority is correct that it is merely
interpreting § 53a-59 (a)(3)
in accordance with our common law, its reasoning is flawed. The majority is unable to point to any
common law in this state that would provide for criminal liability under § 53a-59 (a)(3)
or any other assault statute for the failure to protect a child from
abuse. See part IV of this
dissent. The majority looks for
support in 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra, § 3.3, concerning the "omission to act," and ignores the authors' predicate in § 3.3(a):
"For criminal liability to be based upon the failure to act it must
first be found that there is a duty to act--a legal duty and not simply a moral
duty." Id., p. 283. In fact, §
3.3 is peppered with references to cases in other jurisdictions that
have rejected expanding legal duty to conform to moral duty because there was
no statutory authority imposing a duty to act.
"Generally one has no legal duty to aid another person in peril,
even when that aid can be rendered without danger or inconvenience to
himself." Id., p. 284; see, e.g., State
v. Ulvinen,
313 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Minn.1981) (defendant was
under no legal duty to warn daughter-in-law that defendant's son was planning
to kill her, no matter how morally reprehensible failure to do so was).
Furthermore, the cases from other jurisdictions that the
majority cites are not germane. For
example, two of the jurisdictions cited by the majority as imposing an
affirmative obligation on parents to protect their children from abuse do so
pursuant to statutory authority. In State
v. Williquette,
supra, 129 Wis.2d at 242 and n. 1, 385 N.W.2d 145,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a mother who took no action to stop the
known abuse of her children by their father could be held criminally liable
under a statute in effect at the time, entitled "Abuse of children,"
which provided: "Whoever ... subjects
a child to cruel maltreatment ... is guilty
of a Class E felony." (Emphasis
added.) Wis.
Stat. § 940.201. That statute was subsequently repealed and replaced by
the current statute, Wis.
Stat. § 948.03 (1995). Moreover, in Smith
v. State,
408 N.E.2d 614, 619 (Ind.App.1980), the Indiana
Court of Appeals held that a mother who knowingly left her child with a person
who repeatedly hit the child could be held criminally liable under the Indiana
statute entitled "Neglect of a dependent," which provided in relevant
part: "(a) A person having the
care, custody, or control of a dependent who ... knowingly.... (1) Places the
dependent in a situation that may endanger his life or health ... commits
neglect of a dependent...." Ind.Code
§ 35-46-1-4
(Sup.1979). In State
v. Walden,
306 N.C. 466, 473-76, 293 S.E.2d 780 (1982), the
only case the majority cites in which a defendant was found guilty of assault
for failing to prevent abuse in the absence of statutory imposition of a duty
to act, the North Carolina Supreme Court's holding was based on a theory of
accessory liability, not a common-law duty to act under an assault
statute. With respect to accessory
liability, the trial court in the present case specifically found the defendant
not guilty. See footnote 1 of this
dissent.
*243
Notwithstanding the legislature's clear intention of stripping this court of authority to define substantive
crimes, the majority interprets General
Statutes § 53a-4, entitled "Saving clause," and the official
commentary to § 53a-4, as
giving it jurisdiction to create the new crime of assault by a third party for
failing to protect a child from abuse.
In doing so, the majority grossly misinterprets § 53a-4, and
ignores the final, and most critical, sentence in the commentary. Section
53a-4 provides:
"The provisions of [chapter 951] shall not be construed as
precluding any court from recognizing other principles of criminal liability or
other defenses not inconsistent with such provisions." Chapter 951 of the General Statutes, of
which § 53a-4 is a
part, does *244 not define substantive crimes such as imposing new
obligations, rather, it provides for principles of liability, such as the
mental state required in General
Statutes § 53a-5, and the liability for aiding in the criminal acts of
another in General
Statutes § 53a-8. The commentary to
§ 53a-4 that **698
the majority conveniently omits underscores the prohibition as follows: "This does not mean, however, that the
court is free to fashion additional substantive offenses, for the [penal code]
precludes, by repealing section 54-117, the notion of common law crimes."
Commission to Revise the Criminal Statutes, Penal Code Comments, Conn. Gen.Stat.
Ann. (West 1994) § 53a-4, p. 223.
The opinion of this court
in State
v. Walton,
227 Conn. 32, 630 A.2d 990
(1993), illuminates the majority's
misinterpretation of § 53a-4. In Walton, this court adopted the Pinkerton [FN7] principle of liability--that is, "a conspirator may
be held liable for criminal offenses committed by a coconspirator that are
within the scope of the conspiracy, are in furtherance of it, and are
reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of the
conspiracy." Id.,
at 43, 630 A.2d 990. The majority in Walton first explained that it was "not fashion[ing] an
additional substantive offense by applying Pinkerton to the facts of [that] case ... [because] [t]he Pinkerton principle does not create a substantive offense; it
applies a particular principle of vicarious criminal liability to an
appropriate case." Id.,
at 45 n. 11, 630 A.2d 990. The court in Walton then explained that it could recognize the Pinkerton principle because it "has roots in our state
jurisprudence." Id.,
at 48, 630 A.2d 990. The "application of the Pinkerton principle to a homicide committed in furtherance of a
conspiracy has ... been part of our jurisprudence [since 1945]. See, e.g., State
v. Young,
191 Conn. 636, 642, 469 A.2d 1189 (1983); State
v. McCarthy,
133 Conn. 171, 173, 49 A.2d 594 (1946); State
v. Rossi,
132 Conn. 39, 44, 42 A.2d 354 (1945)." [FN8] State
v. Walton,
supra, at 50-51, 630 A.2d 990. *245 Finally, the Walton court concluded that it could recognize the Pinkerton principle because it was
not "inconsistent with the notion of accessory liability" found in § 53a-8. Id.,
at 52, 630 A.2d 990.
FN7. Pinkerton
v. United States,
328 U.S. 640, 647-48, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946).
FN8. "Indeed,
even prior to Pinkerton,
[this court] had employed a rule of vicarious
criminal liability under which a coconspirator could be held liable for a
murder if that crime was the natural and probable consequence of a common plan
and was committed while acting in pursuance of, or in furtherance of, the
common design.... State
v. Cots,
126 Conn. 48, 59, 9 A.2d 138 (1939)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Diaz,
237 Conn. 518, 529, 679 A.2d 902 (1996).
The majority argues that
it may recognize a duty to protect a child from abuse under § 53a-59 (a)(3)
because it is merely applying a long-standing principle of liability consistent
with the principles of liability permitted by § 53a-4. Even if we assume
that it is merely applying a principle of liability rather than creating a
substantive crime, the majority, however, unlike the court in Walton, fails to cite any cases in which this court has applied this principle of liability for acts of
omission.
[FN9]
Moreover, the majority makes no attempt to explain why the
"principle of imposing a common-law duty" to protect a child from
abuse is not inconsistent with the principles of liability set forth in chapter
951 of the penal code. Indeed, the
majority ignores the fact that the recognition of this new duty under § 53a-59 (a)(3)
is inconsistent with the notion of accessory liability in § 53a-8. For example, this court consistently has held
that one cannot be held liable under a theory of aiding and abetting, for
merely being present at the time of the crime and acquiescing to the commission
of the *246 crime. See, e.g., State
v. Pundy,
147 Conn. 7, 11, 156 A.2d 193 (1959)
("[m]ere presence as an inactive companion, passive acquiescence, or the
doing of innocent acts which may in fact aid the one who commits the crime must
be distinguished from the criminal intent and community of unlawful purpose
shared by one who knowingly and wilfully assists the perpetrator of the offense
in the acts which prepare for, facilitate, or consummate it"); State
v. Thomas,
105 Conn. 757, 762, 136 A. 475 (1927)
(same); State
v. Enanno,
96 Conn. 420, 425, 114 A. 386 (1921) (same). Therefore, § 53a-4 precludes the majority from **699 recognizing this
new duty to protect a child from abuse.
FN9. In the one case
the majority does refer to, State
v. Tomassi, 137
Conn. 113, 119, 75 A.2d 67 (1950), this court
stated in dicta that an act or omission that causes death may constitute murder
or manslaughter. In Tomassi, the court's affirmance of the defendant's conviction was
based on the fact that the defendant wilfully shot and wounded the victim, not
on an omission of care by the defendant.
Id.
IV
The legislature will be
very much surprised to discover that we have in place, under § 53a-59 (a)(3),
a law that provides that the failure to act is punishable criminal
conduct. Although the legislature
recently has grappled with the issue of imposing an affirmative obligation on
the part of a parent and an unrelated adult to protect children from
abuse; see Substitute House Bill No.
5283 (1988) (H.B. No. 5283), entitled "An Act Concerning Facilitation of
Abuse of a Child"; [FN10] it did not enact
the proposed legislation. Nevertheless, the majority of this court, without any
understanding of the implications of its decision today and without the aid of
expert advice that is available to the legislature through the public hearing
process, impetuously and presumptuously crafts a crime of assault that was
never *247 intended by the legislature. Clearly, if the legislature agreed with the majority that,
pursuant to § 53a-59 (a)(3),
parents as well as unrelated adults had an affirmative
legal obligation to protect children from abuse, it never would have had a need
to consider H.B. No. 5283, a bill that explicitly criminalizes the conduct with
which the defendant was charged in the present case. [FN11]
FN10. The select
committee on children issued a favorable report on H.B. No. 5283 to the
judiciary committee. The judiciary
committee took no action on H.B. No. 5283 and, as of this date, the bill
remains dormant.
Substitute House Bill No. 5283, § 1(a) provides: "A
person is guilty of facilitation of abuse of a child when, as a parent,
guardian or caretaker of a child, such person fails to act to protect the child
from death or serious physical injury by another person under circumstances
where there is a continuing course of abusive conduct and the parent, guardian
or caretaker reasonably should have known of such conduct."
FN11. At oral
argument in the present case, the state argued that the legislature's decision
not to consider the select committee on children's proposed amendment to House
Bill No. 6967 in 1997, entitled "An Act Concerning Reporting of Child
Abuse," does not prove that the legislature questions whether § 53a-59 (a)(3)
imposes a duty on parents and unrelated adults to protect children from
abuse. According to the state, "[i]t is at least plausible that our
legislature rejected [the facilitator abuse amendment] because [1] it was aware
of the common-law rule that an adult [who] voluntarily assumes care and
responsibility for a helpless child he or she lives [with] has a duty to
protect that child from abuse, or [2] it's own express public policy of
protecting children from abuse and neglect and making the homes safe for
children, or [3] the fact that [that] certified question is presently pending
before this court."
The detailed record of the select committee on children's
public hearing with respect to child abuse--including H.B. No. 5283--disproves
each of the state's contentions at oral argument. First, if the legislature agreed that § 53a-59 (a)(3)
imposed on persons a duty to protect children from abuse, it would not have
considered imposing on parents and certain unrelated adults the same duty to
act pursuant to H.B. No. 5283. Second,
the legislators who spoke at the public hearing made it clear that, despite the
state's express public policy of protecting children from abuse and neglect and
making homes safe for children, the legislature needed to create a new
statutory duty for parents and certain unrelated adults to protect children
from abuse. See Conn. Joint Standing
Committee Hearings, Select Committee on Children, Pt. 1, 1998 Sess., p. 35,
remarks of Representative Nancy E. Kerensky (legislature should enact H.B. No.
5283 in order to make "a statement
about what parental obligations are in view of this legislature from this point
on " [emphasis added] ); id.,
p. 46, remarks of Representative Paul M. Tymniak ("[W]e still have
children turning up dead. I think we
have to go someplace different in trying to address it."); id., p. 33, remarks of Representative Mary
M. Mushinsky ("the present law doesn't seem to be working to the members
of this committee"). Third, this
court may "presume that the legislature is aware of [the Appellate
Court's] interpretation of a statute, and that its subsequent nonaction may be
understood as a validation of that interpretation." Ralston
Purina Co. v. Board of Tax Review,
203 Conn. 425, 439, 525 A.2d 91 (1987).
The representatives of
several state agencies and several non-profit groups created to support victims
of *248 abuse spoke out against H.B. No. 5283 at the public hearing
before the legislature's select committee on children. The remarks of these speakers set forth
several significant reasons why this court should not undertake the legislative
function and declare by judicial fiat that, "as a matter of policy under
the circumstances of this case," the defendant in this case had an
affirmative legal obligation under § 53a-59 (a)(3)
to protect the child from abuse. [FN12]
FN12. Paul Robinson,
in his article entitled "Criminal Liability for Omissions: A Brief Summary and Critique of the Law in
the United States," 29 N.Y.L. Sch. L.Rev. 101, 104 (1984), also points out
several reasons why the issue of imposingaffirmative legal obligations on
persons to protect children from abuse is best left for the legislature. "There is a general, albeit declining,
reluctance in the United States to impose affirmative duties and to punish
nonperformance of those duties.
Various explanations for the reluctance to criminalize inactivity have
been offered. First, there is difficulty
in defining with sufficient clarity the effort that must be expended in order
to satisfy the duty. Second, the
inherent ambiguity in defining the scope of a duty leads to speculation about
guilt and thereby poses a threat to society more serious than the harm
prevented by requiring affirmative conduct.
Third, because 'prevailing attitudes draw sharp distinctions between
overt action and passivity[, the] legislature cannot ignore the mores, nor
should it implement them beyond necessary limits.' Finally, a governmental demand to perform is significantly more
intrusive than a command to refrain from harmful action and therefore must be
justified by a significant overriding public interest and must be imposed in a
way that minimizes the extent of intrusion." Id.
**700 First, those
who testified before the committee expressed unanimous concern that holding
persons liable for not protecting children from abuse actually would cause more
harm than it would prevent. They
testified that if the legislature wants to accomplish its goal of preventing
children from being injured as a result of violence, it must first consider
ways to improve the delivery of services to at risk families under the state's
present child welfare system. For
example, Diane Edell, program director of the Aetna Foundation *249
Children Center at Saint Francis Hospital and Medical Center, testified that
"[t]his law ... will [not] do anything to protect children. There are other things ... prevention
programs, specialized mental health programs, helping mothers to leave abusive
relationships that will help us help our children better." Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings,
Select Committee on Children, Pt. 1, 1998 Sess., p. 56.
Furthermore, several
speakers testified that, if the legislature imposed liability on persons who
fail to protect a child from abuse, it would discourage persons who are in the
best position to know whether a child has been abused from informing the
appropriate authorities after the abuse occurs. See id., p. 64, remarks of
Frederick Berrien, medical director of the Children's
Advocacy Center; id., p. 78, remarks of
Raphael Podolsky, an attorney for the Legal Assistance Resource Center of
Connecticut, Inc. "If we want to help these children we need to find ways
to make these parents stronger, not create laws that will result in fewer
parents coming forward with their suspicions." Id., p. 56, remarks of Edell, program director of the Aetna
Foundation Children Center at Saint Francis Hospital and Medical Center.
Finally, according to chief public defender Gerard A. Smyth, H.B. No. 5283
would "discourage people from acting as 'caretakers' " of children,
and, consequently, would affect the level of care received by children in this
state. Id., p. 3 of Smyth's prepared
statement.
Second, nearly every
speaker at the public hearing before the select committee on children testified
that the legislature did not need to enact H.B. No. 5283 because "the
situation that [it] is intended to address is already covered by" § 53-21, the
risk of injury to a child statute. Id.
According to Smyth, Podolsky, Jessica Stevens, director of the state chapter of
the National Organization for Women, Linda Pearce Prestley, child advocate for
the state of Connecticut, Gail Burns Smith, *250 the executive director
of Connecticut Sexual Assault Crisis Services, Inc., and Kristine D. Ragaglia,
commissioner of the department of children and families, § 53-21 can and
should be used to prosecute parents and others who fail to protect children from abuse.
See id., p. 3 of Smyth's prepared statement, pp. 72, 51, 9, 42, and p. 2
of Ragaglia's prepared statement.
Third, the speakers at the
public hearing before the select committee on children agreed that, even if the
committee approved H.B. No. 5283, the bill would have to be made more specific
in order to set forth the effort that must be extended to satisfy the duty to
protect children from abuse. According
to Smyth, for example, it was unclear whether parents, guardians and caretakers
could satisfy the duty established in H.B. No. 5283, to act to protect such
child from physical abuse, by reporting a risk of abuse to the department of
children and families; or whether such
persons would be required "[t]o take more active measures, such as **701
concealing a child from a custodial parent if necessary ... [o]r ...
withholding a child from a parent suspected of abuse." Id., p. 1 of Smyth's prepared statement.
Clearly, all of these
delineated issues are best left for the legislature's consideration, not
ours. See Mahon
v. Heim,
165 Conn. 251, 257, 332 A.2d 69 (1973) ("the
adoption of ... [a] specific exception [to the standard of care applicable to
the conduct of minors, holding them to the adult standard of care when they
engage in activities which are potentially highly hazardous] is ... one
peculiarly appropriate for further legislative consideration and action rather
than for implementation by judicial fiat").
Finally, in crafting this
new common-law crime, the majority acknowledges constitutional problems in
attempting to apply it in this case.
For example, the *251 majority has created an ex post facto law
in its classic sense. State
v. Ross,
230 Conn. 183, 281-82, 646 A.2d 1318 (1994),
cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1165, 115 S.Ct. 1133, 130 L.Ed.2d 1095 (1995)
("[t]he prohibition of ex post facto laws forbids the enactment of any law
which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it
was committed" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Moreover, even if the new law is not ex post
facto, it cannot be applied to the defendant in the present case because a
fundamental requisite of due process is that a person must be put on notice,
before the alleged commission of a crime, that such nonfeasance is criminal. United
States v. Lanier,
520 U.S. 259, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 1225, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) ("due process bars courts from applying a novel
construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any
prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its
scope"); Grayned
v. Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (statute must "give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited"); State
v. McGann,
199 Conn. 163, 177, 506 A.2d 109 (1986)
("[w]hen a[n] ... unforeseeable state-court construction of a criminal statute is applied retroactively to subject a
person to criminal liability for past conduct, the effect is to deprive him of
due process of law in the sense of fair warning that his contemplated conduct
constitutes a crime" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Furthermore, there is at least a question as
to whether the defendant's convictions for assault and risk of injury violate
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. J. Bruckmann, G. Nash & J. Katz,
Connecticut Criminal Caselaw Handbook:
A Practitioner's Guide (1989) p. 151 (where multiple charges are
considered same, judgment of conviction may not be entered on both). These constitutional claims, however, will
be raised before the Appellate Court.
See *252 State
v. Golding,
213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989); see also State
v. Indrisano,
228 Conn. 795, 800, 640 A.2d 986 (1994).
I would affirm the
judgment of the Appellate Court.
Accordingly, I dissent.