Military Responses

Desert Storm (1991) & Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) were both highly successful U.S. military campaigns against conventional Iraqi armed forces.

**Asymmetric warfare** – conflict between unequal forces, involving unconventional tactics and strategies to exploit a stronger opponent’s weaknesses

Outnumbered almost 3 to 1, the Parthians destroyed a Roman legion at Carrhae in Mesopotamia. Horsemen out-maneuvered foot soldiers fighting in block-formation.

What networked tactics did the IDF use against Palestinians in urban areas? Do Israel’s experiences hold any lessons for U.S. counterinsurgency efforts? What was the initial U.S. military strategy in Iraq & what were its problems? What changes did General Petraeus make in 2007? Did the “surge” suppress Al-Qaida-in-Iraq and Sunni insurgents? What other factors were in play? What is COIN? How does it apply social network analysis to insurgencies? Can COIN succeed by July 2011 in Afghanistan? Why/why not?
Operation Defensive Shield

The Israel Defense Forces’ Operation Defensive Shield in April 2002 was its biggest campaign since 1967. Seth Jones described network and org’l learning strategies by IDF troops to clear Nablus of Palestinian fighters.

Goal: “herd the gang” into the casbah, capture or kill fighters without many civilian casualties

**Swarming tactics** involved “systematic use of force and fire by dispersed IDF units to strike Palestinian militants from all directions”

High urban density made human intelligence (HUMINT) “critical but extremely challenging”

“The IDF worked as a series of networks, quickly moving intelligence and information horizontally & vertically, and attacking as a series of small units.”

Why does Jones say that ODS was a clear tactical success but not a strategic success? What aspect(s) didn’t the IDF understand?

How & when might military force succeed in “weakening the ability and will to attack” by an opponent in asymmetric warfare?
Seth Jones argued, “It takes a network to fight a network.” How well does this slogan apply to Freedonia’s counterterror efforts against the FLO?

President Firefly has put General Harpo in charge of a Special Army Weapon to clear a large urban slum of FLO irregular forces.

Gen. Harpo wants to copy IDF tactics, with loosely coordinated SAW units entering the slum on all sides. Because the IDF approach requires “learning organizations,” your SAW unit must design its own particular tactical procedures, and innovate as it goes along.

What are some tactical innovations and adaptations that your SAW unit could try (e.g., breach walls, post snipers, interrogate civilians, GPS, …)?

Why do you believe those tactical procedures might be effective?

How will you exchange information & HUMINT with other SAW units in the heat of battle? What minimal level of coordination is necessary to succeed?

How will you try to minimize civilian casualties (“collateral damage”), which might actually recruit more new FLO fighters than SAW can capture and kill?
U.S. Occupies Iraq

Should IDF counterinsurgency tactics have been adapted by the U.S. military to the Iraq occupation that followed “Mission Accomplished”?

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s invasion plan involved only 160,000 ground troops. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki later told the Congress, “something in the order of several hundred thousand soldiers” should have been used in post-war Iraq. Rumsfeld replaced him with more compliant officers.

In November, 2006, CENTCOM Commander Gen. John Abizaid told Congress that General Shinseki’s estimate of the number needed had proved correct.

Initial U.S. strategy stationed troops inside large military bases. Foreign jihadis flocked to Zarqawi’s Al-Qaida-in-Iraq. Roadside IEDs killed and maimed hundreds of Americans. U.S. public’s support for the war eroded. The politically divided Iraqi government was unable to govern effectively.

Deciding in late 2006 that Rumsfeld’s strategy had failed, President Bush brought in Robert Gates to design a new Iraq War strategy.
Flipping the COIN

Implementing the new strategy was Gen. David Petraeus, coauthor of FM3-24 Counterinsurgency (2006). The COIN Paradoxes below de-emphasize relying on centralized military commanders and favor troop flexibility to befriend the locals.

- Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be
- Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is
- The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and the more risk must be accepted
- Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction
- Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot
- The host nation doing something tolerably is normally better than us doing it well
- If a tactic works this week, it might not work next week; if it works in this province, it might not work in the next
- Tactical success guarantees nothing
- Many important decisions are not made by generals

Gen. Petraeus showing that Baghdad is safe for taking a walk – if you bring enough friends.

COIN Social Networking

Appendix E discussed how network analysis contributed to 1950s British defeat of Malaysian insurgents, capture of Saddam Hussein, and calming of Fallujah’s residents after Marines recaptured the city from insurgents in 2004.

“… a group operating as a network has specific enabling characteristics. These characteristics are counter-intuitive to military analysts and commanders who have trained within the efficiency of a hierarchy with strict senior-subsordinate relationships and established procedures. … SNA supports the commander’s understanding of the COIN battle-space.”

By living among local residents, COIN units can build social ties and gain their trust. These relations may give troops timely access to intelligence on the insurgents’ whereabouts, locations of arms caches, and planned attacks.

Should formal SNA methodology be part of military commanders’ training?
The “Surge”

Bush sent 28,000 more troops, stationed in Baghdad neighborhoods & in Anbar Province, where they armed and paid local “Sunni Awakening” patrols. By 2008, both U.S. troop (below) & Iraqi civilian deaths had fallen (next slide).


July 2007: Full deployment

www.usatoday.com/2007-09-30-deaths_N.htm
TABLE 2.

Ethno-Sectarian Violence

Density plots depict incidents of ethno-sectarian deaths.

Ethno-Sectarian Deaths

Source: General David H. Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National Force–Iraq, 8-9 April 2008
Can COIN Succeed in Afghanistan?

Afghan-Iraq conditions differ on many dimensions: rural-urban; ethnic & religious diversity; strong-weak central governments; clarity of US invasion reasons; …. 

Petraeus: “You don’t move into a village in Afghanistan the way that we were able to move into neighborhoods in Iraq,” he said. “You have to move on the edge of it, or just near it, but you still have to have a persistent security presence.”

Corruption & ineptitude of Pres. Karzai’s regime may be weakest condition for handing off defense to ANSF. Almost 25% of ballots in the Sept. 2010 parliamentary election were fraudulent according to int’l observers.* Karzai admitted Iran gave him bundles of cash (so did the U.S.). He wants to ban all 52 private Western security firms as threats to the Afghan security forces.

60 Minutes: Predator & Reaper drones controlled by pilots in Nevada kill scores of A-Q, Taliban targets in Af-Pak

http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5245555n

Hillel Olfek questions the morality of CIA drones: Is Obama Admin’s ban on use of torture “more repugnant than … incinerating suspected terrorists and knowing … that innocents will be killed”?
